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INTRODUCT ION 
In the broadest sense of the word every politically 
organized socIety has a ConstItution which, wrItten or unwrit-
ten, determines the political agencies which shall exist and the 
powers which shall be assigned to them. From 1789 to 1871, 
France was a field of constItutIonal experiments perhaps unique 
to the world. The variety of political regimes that she inau-
gurated in the course of these years is not found in the history 
of another people. The eIght constitutIons which were promul-
gated succeeded one another wIth such discerning. rapIdity that 
the people had scarcely time to become acqUainted with them. 
In fact, it would be necessary to count the transformations 
many of them underwent in their brief existence. 
The first constitution, that of 1791, which had been 
legally established was overthrown in a short time by the in-
surrection of August 10, 1792. In the following month of Sep-
tember, the Republic was proclaimed and the First Republican 
Constitution of 1'193 was declared. Although 1t was never en-
forced, it 1s numbered among the constitutions beoause those 
who composed it governed Franoe for the next two years. The 
seoond Republioan Constitution, or the Constitution of the Year 
III, beoame the offioial rule of Franoe from 1795 until the 
i 
11 
.. 
accession of Napoleon in 1799. He drew up the Constitut1on of 
the Year VIII and proclaimed it the official organ of government 
in France until he abdicated in 1814. The fourth political 
regime took root in Franoe through the Restoration Constitution 
granted by Louis XVIII. This reign, however, was interrupted 
for a short period by the re-establishment of Napoleon I and was 
finally overthrown by the insurreotion of 1830. Next the Con-
stitution of 1830 was established by Louis Philippe and remained 
in foroe until the Seoond Republio was proolaimed by the Revo-
lution of 1848. This government had scaroely exeroised its 
authority when it was over-thrown by the ooup d'~ of 1851. 
Through this action, Napoleon III assumed power until the revo-
lution of 1870. 
A superfioial observer may oonolude that Franoe under-
went more frequent and radioal ohanges during these years than 
in any previous oentury. In a sense this is true: the outward 
form of government was overturned repeatedly; monarohy gave way 
to republio and vioe versa. These new forms of government also 
brought important ohanges in the organization and exercise of 
legislative power in addition to the transformed exeoutive. 
However, if publio law is oonsidered from a juristio pOint of 
view the pioture of Franoe is very different. Governments oame 
and went very muoh as ministers oome and go now, but all that is 
oharaoteristic of French public law either reaches back into 
the old regime or is the product of the Revolution and the 
empire. 
iii 
The Constitution of 1791 derives its chief interest 
from the drastic changes it proposed for the political re-
organization of the French nation. The France of the old regime 
was an ancient edifice which fifty generations had been building 
for more than fifteen centuries. As time went on the great con-
flict of ideas and interests, the tragic class of forceful per-
sonalities, the international struggles produced a structure 
whose parts lacked proportion and threatened to fall into rUin. 
Conditions in France warranted the belief that some fundamental 
changes were imperative. The nation was in a most important 
crisis; and the great question whether France should inaugurate 
a Consti tuti on or, continue to be goverlled by will was uppermost 
in every mind and heart in France. This review will show that 
the Constitution of 1791 was promulgated to check the tendency 
on the part of the French king to centralization through the 
introduction of three distinct branches of government--the exec-
utive, the legislative, and the judicial. This does not imply 
that a centralized government is not good, for such a government, 
when it is well managed and carefully watohed from above, may 
reach a degree of efficiency and quickness of action which a 
iv 
• 
gov.ernment of local powers cannot hope to equal. But if a 
strong central government becomes disorganized, if inefficiency 
or idleness, or above all dishonesty, once obtain a ruling place 
in it, the whole governing body is diseased. 
• 
CHAFfER I 
PRELIMINARY CONSTITUTIO~AL PROCEEDINGS 
If one were to examIne the governments of Europe in 
the eighteenth oentury, and the polloies whloh they followed or 
attempted to tollow, he would tind that everywhere oontrol was 
ln the hands of the few and dlreoted to the advantage ot the 
tew. The ldea that the flrst duty of the state was to assure 
the welfare ot the people was not actually practiced. On the 
contrary, the duty ot the state had become a duty of pleasing 
the rulers and the privIleged classes. Europe was organized 
monarchlcally and aristocratioally, and for the beneflt of 
monarohs and aristooraoies. There was a widespread feelIng that 
revolutions were impending, and this feellng became a reallty in 
Prance whioh was, politioally, highly organized, and strongly 
1 
centralized in 1789. In a letter to Marquis de la Luzerne, 
Gouverneur Morris glves the following impression of Franoe in 
the year 1789: 
1 
France seems to be in a state 
whioh oannot fail eventually 
to produoe dissent ions in prlvate 
circles. The seeds are already 
James Thompson The Frenoh Revolution. 
Press, New York,-r§45, 198 
1 
Oxford University 
sown; and you (who have lived in a 
Republio) know how quiokly plants 
vegetate ••• Republioanism is absolutely 
a moral influenza from whioh neither 
Titles, Plaoes, nor even the Diadem 
oan guard their possessor. If when 
the States assemble their Debates 
should be published t~e Lord preserve 
us from a hot summer. 
2 
He also informs Count de Maustier, the Frenoh Minister to the 
United States, that "your nobles, your olergy, your people are 
all in motions for the eleotions. A Spirit whioh has lain dor-
mant for Generations starts up and stares about ignorant of the 
means of obtaining, but ardently desirous to possess its 
3 
object." 
In order to understand the nature and depth of this 
politioal and sooial unrest whioh existed in Franoe, it 1s nec-
ssary to know something of the polit10al organization and 
ooial structure whioh the French Revolution aimed to change. 
In France, the orown had always been the symbol of national 
nity and power. During the period in whioh the nation, under 
he deft guidance of Riohelieu and Mazarin, achieved supremaoy 
1n Europe, royal authority became absolute in Franoe. During 
Ann Cary Morris (editor) The Diary and Letters of Gouverneur 
Morris. I Charles ScrIbner's Sons, New York, 1888, xi 
fb1d., i11 
3 
<tI 
the reign of Lou1s XIV (1643 .. 1715) the Frenoh Monarohy achieved 
1ts final form, and d1d not vary from that time until the out-
4 
break of the revolution. Fervid as were the French in their 
loyalty to the K1ng, they were not willing to become subjeots to 
lawless caprice. They striotly adhered to the prinoiple formu-
lated by Montesqu1eu between a despotism which has fear as its 
guiding prInciple, and a monarohy whioh has honor as its rule 
of conduot. The despotic oontrol whioh Louis XVI exeroised 
over Franoe gradually deoreased as the organization and manage-
ment of the government 1noreased. Therefore, on the eve of the 
revolution, the true center of power resided not in the hands 
of Louis XVI but in a Royal Counoil oomposed of more than forty 
members. This was probably the worst evil from whioh Franoe 
suffered since the members of this oouncil pretended to serve 
the sovereign and the people; but their rewards were determined 
by intrigue and favor and were entirely disproportionate to 
5 
their services. 
other serious ev11s of the anoient regime were the 
6 
unfair taxes suoh as the ta11le, and the gabelle, and the 
4 Franq01s Mignet The French Revolution. (Vol. X of The 
H1story of Nat1onS"idlted by Henry c. Lodge) The H.-' Snow 
and Son ~mpany, Ghioago, 1907, 3 
5 Edward Lowell The Eve of the French Revolution. 
Houghton, M1ffiInanacOmpany, Boston, 1892, 11-13 
6 Taille, a heavy property tax; gabelle, salt tax 
4 
• 
profligate method of oolleoting known as .. farming," the numer-
ous and oonflloting legal systems in the oountry, the internal 
oustom lines, the "lettres de oaohet" (arbitrary arrest), the 
sale of offioes, the money payments to the judges, the slow and 
'. 
expensive legal procedure, torture, oruel penalties, and the 
feudal dues owed to the lord. However, it would be a mistake to 
conolude that the revolution was caused by the worst conditions 
of tyranny and oppression, for the people of Franoe were not the 
"I 
most oppressed people of Europe. There must be a spirit to 
resist, and usually the most determined resistanoe oomes from 
those who,have seoured at least a degree of liberty, and the 
Frenoh enjoyed a greater degree of liberty than almost any other 
people an the oontinent. Tbe resistanoe oame from the growing 
middle olass who desired a share in the government, and by 
arousing a vigorous publio opinion in favor of reform, they 
8 
would make their aspiratiOns a reality. 
Remedies were suggested in the form of limiting the 
arbitrary power of the government by a oonstltutlon whioh would 
bestow on an assembly of representatives great power. This 
"I George Andrews The Constitution in the Earl! Frenoh Revolu-
tion. F. S. cro1'ts a~d Company, liiw-rork, 1 27, 1-2 
8 ~., 4 
-
r 
5 
assembly would make laws and sanction taxation; abolish privi-
legeS and abuses; and establish equality before the law. The 
three orders of French society which had been reduced to a state 
of political nullity by the Royalty now assumed new life and 
vigor for the revolutionary step meant the reformation of 
9 
France. The nobles in 1789 had lost all that had made them 
respected; and preserved all that made them despised; their 
privileges appeared as a unique favor conferred on some individ-
ual. They were tired of being merely courtiers; the higher 
clergy desired additonal influence; the commoners demanded a 
recognition of their existence. The nation impatiently compar-
ed the government of England, where talent could rise to any-
thing, with that of France where one was nothing except by birth 
or favor. Thus all thought and action turned equally to the 
10 
same end--Liberty, Equality, Fraternity. 
Therefore, there was universal rejoicing in France 
when. the convocation of the State General was announced because 
no one remembered a time when the government had consulted the 
people and they felt such a time would not corne again. For 175 
years the assembly had not convened and during that period no 
9 Fred M. Fling Source Problems on the French Revolution. 
Harper and Brothers, New York, ~1~8 
10 E. L. Higgins (editor) The French Revolution. Houghton 
Mifflin Company, Boston,~38, 3 
6 
• 
writs had been issued and no eleotions had been held. The old 
institutions were worn out and oould no longer work without 
irritating the people. Sooiety had beoome oramped by the des-
potio anarohy under whioh it had struggled. The States General 
gave hope of a oonstltutlon, and this word opened the door to 
every kind of supposition and afforded a temporary satisfaction 
11 
to every aspiration. 
Talleyrand states a "heavenly day" dawned for the 
opening of the Assembly. Morris desoribes the high dignitaries 
of Church and State in their brilliant robes of office in strik-
ing contrast to the members of the third estate olad in their 
gloomy black surtouts. However, they oarried themselves proudly 
in this attire for they had achieved the desire of being onoe 
12 
again reunited at Versailles. From that day on, the struggle 
began between the privileged and the unprivileged, between 
absolute and representative government, between the old and the 
; 
new regime. All of France was in a state of contradictory and 
oonfused agitation. A state of oonfidenoe and fear, joy and 
rage existed throughout the nation. 
Before and after the decision to summon the States 
11 Louis Madelin The Frenoh Revolution. William Heinemann, 
London, 1916, 3-4 
12 MorriS, 70 
7 
• 
General, a great deal was said and written about a constitution. 
Count Fersen, a Swedish nobleman at the court, characterized 
13 
the universal talk about a constitution as a "delirium.1t 
Those who imagined that France possessed a submerged constitu-
tion that mIght be extracted from her annals had a difficult 
task. Lanjuinais desired to direct the politics of 1789 by a 
14 
charter of the year 864. Others maintained that France had 
a constitution which was not written, but rested upon the tradi-
tion that the monarch was hereditary and his authority abso-
15 
lute. Kitchin, on the other hand, states -that the solid 
foundations of constitutional life, in the hearts of a people 
sharing in power, interested in public affairs, responsible for 
16 
the direction of opinion, had never been laid in France.1t 
Consequently, out of the welter- of opinion, two views emerged. 
One group maintained that the country was either without a con-
stItution, or if one existed, it was so vicious, that it was not 
worth preserving. In either case, an entirely new instrument 
13 
14 
15 
16 
Andrews, 2 
John E. Acton Lectures on the French Revolution. (edited 
by John F!ggis) Macmillan-and Company, tondon, 1916, 103 
Faustin Helie Les constitutions de la France. 
Edouard Duchemin;-Paris, 1880, 3 -- --
George ·W. Kitchin History of France. III The Clarendon 
Press, Oxford, 1803, 361 
8 
was necessary. The other claimed that France already had a 
constitut1on which had been violated or ignored. The existing 
conditlon, they sald, merely required the restoration of the 
17 
ancient constitution with the elimination of abuses. 
When the States General were opened by the K1ng at 
Versailles on May 5, 1789, there were about 1,200 deputies, of 
whom about 300 represented the clergy, 300 the nob1lity, and 
18 
the other 600 the third estate. It was evident that the 
common people had been affected greatly by the assembly; and 
the quest10n of moment was the form to be taken by the States 
General, since 1ts solut1on would decide whether political 
supremacy should rest with the nobles and clergy or with the 
third estate. The three orders met in separate chambers, but 
when the formation of a single chamber was rumored the nobles 
and clergy urged vote "by order;" the third estate, desiring to 
19 
have a precedent in their favor, demanded vote -by head." 
Since the assembly bad not met since 1614, there was great doubt 
and difficulty as to the r1ght course to follow. No one exactly 
17 Andrews, 2-4 
18 Bertha Gardiner The French Revolution. Longmans, Green, 
and Company, New York, 1918, 306 
19 Leopold G. Legg (editor) Select Documents Illustrative 
of the H1sto~ of the Frenoh ReVOlution. I Tbe Olarendon 
Press, OXl'or , 1'908,9 
9 
• 
knew what the States General was or how it was composed. Eng-
lIshmen who chanced to be in France were eagerly questioned; 
20 
old documents were looked into but no solution resulted. The 
questIon of the double representation for the third estate and 
the vote by head, instead of by order, divided France into two 
hostile camps. They were discussed in the press with bItterness 
and the important topic was always what attItude would the gov-
ernment take. 
Louis XVI, who had summoned the States General, be-
oause of oircumstances he was unable to control, again showed 
himself incapable of leading the natIon in the crisis at hand. 
He regarded the convocation of the States General ohiefly, If 
not altogether, as a great finanoial experIment; "8 machine by 
which he might grapple with the hourly growing defICit, and 
21 
lIghten the unbearable burden of the debt." His message to 
the assembly was short and full of unexoeptional sentiments 
and a fatherly regard for his people, but there was not a word 
about the topio nearest the representatives' hearts--constitu-
tional reform. He had conceded to the assembly to bring happi-
ness to the people and prosperIty to the state. The final de-
cisIon of the organization was left to Louis XVI, but the king 
20 
21 
Henry Morse Stephens A HIstory of the French Revolution. 
I Longmans, Green, and company,-Wew-!ork, le97, § 
Kltohln, 495 
r-. 
, 
10 
.. 
bad neIther the statesmanshIp to see what the crisis dema~qed 
nor the decisIon to carry out what more able advisers suggested. 
For government to be effective, the public authorities must act 
1n harmony; this c.ondItion was lacking in the states General. 
When Louis refused to deolare himself against the 
privIleged orders, the ineVitable consequenoe at onoe ensued. 
Negotiations proved fruitless and dispute arose as to the torm 
~f government to be adopted. The third estate refused to pro-
22 
ceed with the business until they were jOined by the other two. 
They did not spare their words in seeking to arouse publio opin-
Ion against the upper olass~ Although there had been no direot 
collision between the crown and the representatives of the third 
estate, the long inefficienoy of the king had destroyed belief 
in the royal power as an instrument of government. Yet they 
were deeply attached to the monarchy as a form of government 
and thoroughly loyal to the person of the king. Therefore, when 
Louis XVI oonfirmed the rumor ~hat they were to meet as 'three 
separate states, the third estate took matters into their own 
23 
hands and deolared themselves the National Assembly of France. 
Having been shut out of the regular meeting place by government 
troops, they went to a neighboring indoor tennis court on June 20 
22 Fling, 10-11 
23 Ceoil Headlam France. Adam and Charles Blook, London, 
1833, 340-341 
11 
• 
where they took the famous oath never to separate until they had 
given a oonstitution to Franoe. A majority of the olergy and a 
minority of the nobles joined the third estate. Finally at the 
urgent request of the King, who feared an insurreotion, the re-
mainder of the nobles and olergy jOined the oommons on June 27, 
1789. Thus the third estate triumPhed in the union of the orders 
This reunited body oalled itself the National Constitutional 
Assembly--an assembly representative of the wbole nation whose 
24 
funotion was to enaot a oonstitution. 
If the old oonstitutlons of Franoe had perished, there 
still remained the old elements of sooiety--the nobles, the 
olergy, and the third estate who had freely expressed their 
opinions in the oahiers whioh, it is sald, amounted to fifty or 
sixty thousands. There were letters in whioh the people embod-
ied their grievanoes and desires; however, in none was a republio 
demanded, nor even a ohallenge to dynasty; nor did they even in-
directly oriticize the King's ,oonduot. In all these documents, 
the Frenoh were imbued with an ardent royalism and a warm devo-
25 
tion to Louis XVI. In fact, none of the petitioners attribut-
ed their stated grievances to the monarchy nor even to the king. 
24 
25 
Fortun~ Benvenuti Eaisodes of the French Revolution. 
Simpkin, Marshall an Company, London, 1880, 27 
Fran~ois Aulard Histoire po11t1que de la revolution 
francaise. I L1bra1rie A.lOo11n, Parls;-190i, 80-81 
9 
12 
• 
In the documents of the more humble petit10ns from the par1shes~ 
there was a note of conf1dence l love, and gratitude. Those of 
the nobles and clergYI though less enthusiast1c I appeared equal-
ly loyal. Their complaints read that "the King's agents had de-
ceived the King" or that "the agents hampered his power of doing 
26 
good." Malouet descr1bes the cahiers as the true depos1tory 
of the opinions and des1res of France; bowever l certain other 
historians as Babeau l LoutcheskYI and Wahl have regarded them 
27 
as flnoisy clamor." This might be explained by the fact that 
man is always d1scontent with the government which rules himl 
and if several millions were called upon to express their com-
pla1nts l they certainly would complain. 
The cah1ers were consc1entiously studied by the King 
and his ministers. The clergy started an investigation of their 
letters l and the commons summarized the opinions of their gri"ev-
ances on the single subject of a constitution. The cahiers 
revealed with clearness a middle class visualizing a reform 
program and the deep discontent of the work1ng class. They 
showed a mode of life where abuse was borne with patience and a 
lack of resentment. According to these letters l deep divisions 
26 
27 
Charles Chassin Les elections et les cahiers de Paris. 
I Jouaust et SigaUi; ParisI 1888 1 ~ 
Madelinl 43 
~' 
, -
.. 
between class and class existed; yet there was no class war. 
All the orders of society demanded greater freedom from re-
28 
13-14 
striction and a larger voice in the government. They demanded 
in general that France should not cease to be a monarchical 
government; that the King should remain sacred and law should 
not pass without his sanction. On the other hand, they desired 
that the States General be invested with legislative power. 
Conoerning the distinction of orders, dissention was absolute. 
The cah1ers of the third estate desired the termination of the 
division of orders; those of the nobles, with few exceptions, 
demanded the continuance of the division of orders. The clergy 
were divided. On matters of general interest, they desired ~ 
vote by head; an matters of interest to each class, they wished 
29 , 
a vote by order. In a report to the assembly on July 27, 1789, 
Clermont-Tonnerre summarized the cahiers aocording to prinoiples 
30 
of unanimous agreement and partial argument. The people felt 
they could never be rid of these evils unless a constItution was 
Inaugurated, and thus the program of 1789 which was to give 
France a constitution went into effect. 
28 Prosper S. de Hauranne. Histoire du gouvernement 
iarlementaire en France. I Michel Levy Freres, Paris, 
85'7, 21-23 -
29 Higgins, 4 
30 Appendix I and II 
15 
As soon as the fusion of the Orders had been effected, 
the assembly undertook its work of forming the constItution. 
This was a task of transforming into a limited monarchy by a 
paper constitution a state which had never known anything else 
31 
but absolutism. The task seemed light for the spirit of the 
majority was confident to excess. "The constItution is perhaps 
the work of a day, because it is the result of the enlightenment 
of an age,· said Barere. Every member of the assembly felt that 
they were all legislators and that they had come to amend the 
wrongs of the past, and to assure the future happiness of the 
32 
Frenoh Nation. In reality the bUsiness of framing a oonsti-
tut10n proved very arduous. 
A committee was selected on July 6, 1789 to draw up a 
plan of procedure for framing the constItution. The following 
eight men were chosen--Mounier, Talleyrand, Sleyes, Clermont-" 
Tonnerre, Lally-Tollendal, Champion de Ciroe, Bergasse, and 
Chapelier. Mounier was chosen as the spokesman for the com-
mittee not only because he was a firm believer in the superior-
lty of the English system of government and a successful leader 
, 
in the uprising ln the Dauphine, but because of his firm 
31 John Abbott The French Revolution of 1789. I Harper and 
Brothers, New-VOrk, 1887, 141 -- ----
32 The cambri~e Modern Historl. VIII The Macmillan Company, 
New York, 1 04, 176 
16 
33 
character and uncontested honesty. In his introductory re-
marks, Mounier explained that sInce the Crown had suffered in 
the past trom faithless ministers and privileged groups, a con-
stitution which should precisely determine the rights ot the 
monarch and the r1ghts ot the nation would be as useful to the 
34 
King as to the subjects. He explaIned that no political 
system could evade the problem of authority. The prIncipal aim 
of any constitution, even of the most democratic, is to produce 
a government which shall govern, which shall possess real In-
itIatIve and command. At the same tIme, however, it must dis-
ciplIne itself to obey, within certain limits, the ministry 
35 
which created it. All government, whether it is a monarchy, 
absolute or limited, oligarchy or republic, draws its power 
from the consent ot the nation, and thus can claim that it 
36 
emanates from the nation. 
The princIples of 1789 were based on the idea that the 
nation is sovereign and that all its members are tree and possess 
equal rights. After Mounier had established the rIght and duty 
of the Assembly, he Indicated that two principles should inspire 
33 
34 
35 
36 
de Hauranne, 36 
Andrews, 12 
William L. Middleton The French Political System 
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and dominate the new oonstltutian--the prinoiple of monarohy 
and the prinoiple of representation. These two princIples must 
organize the oonstitution and build up around it institutions 
whioh would make it live. From th1s startIng pOint, the polit-
ioal oonstitution was drawn up dominated by the rule of the sep-
37 
aration of powers, exeoutive, legislative, and judioial. The 
assembly deolared to establish: 
1. The natural rights of man 
2. The prinoiples of monarchy 
3. The rIghts of the nation, 
the rights of the King, 
the rights of the oitizens 
under the Frenoh government. 
4. The organization and funotion 
of the NatIonal Assembly 
5. The organization and funotion 
of the provinoial assemblies 
and munioipa11ties. 
6. The prin01ples, obligations, 
and limits of judicial power. 
7. The funotions and duties of 
military power. 38 
Mounier proposed to begin with a Deolaration of the 
Rights of Man. On August 1, the Assembly began to disouss these 
drafts; but slnoe Franoe was without a government and Frenoh 
sooiety was in dissolution, Mlrabeau adv1sed the adjournment of 
the drafts until the oonstitution had been finished. However, 
the assembly oontinued the dlsoussion until August 27 when the 
37 
38 
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last olause was passed. The deputies of 1789 believed that 
all the misgovernment and publio ills were due to a failure to 
reoognize the rIghts of man. When the oharter of rights was 
aooepted, a new doubt arose. If the oitizen received rights 
then to obtain a greater peaoe, should he not also be presented 
40 
with a oatechism of duties?' The deputies said nothing but 
let the1r oreed stand for what it was--a grand entrance to the 
oonstitution. 
Evolution in government had made rapid strides in 
Franoe from the opening of the Assembly on May 6 until the 
adoption of the Deolaration of the Rights of oMan on August 2? 
Louis XVI had dismissed Neoker, the finanoial minister, from 
offioe on July 11 without any future plan of aotion. On July 
14, the fall of the BastIlle indioated the fall of the old 
monarohy; therefore, Louis had no ohoice but to yield to all 
that was demanded of him. Now the nation was ready to adopt 
its first written constitution based on the Deolaration of the 
Rights of Man. The events whioh had taken plaoe made it more 
urgent and indispensable that they abolish the institutions 
41 
which have injured equality and rights. 
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First and foremost in the constitution, the principle 
of the separation of powers was applied with the utmost critical 
42 
stringency. In the preamble, the essence of the constitution, 
they state that the national sovereignty is exercised by repre-
sentation through an assembly (the legIslature), the King (the 
executive), and by delegation through a court of justice (the 
judicial). Thus the age-long monarchy was abolished. The 
assembly seems to have thought that the executive had been and 
would always be the enemy of the legIslature. Though they cared 
little for Montesquieu, they were fascinated by his doctrine 
that the separation of the legislative, executive, and judicial 
puwers one from another is the primary condition in the func-
43 
tioning of political liberty. They declared in the Declara-
tion of the RIghts of Man that Uevery society in wh1ch the sep-
44 . 
aration £! powers 1s not determined has no Const1tut1on.u Al-
though a universal opinion for a constItutional and representa-
tive monarchy had been reached, the organization of this mon-
archy brought forth two distinct vIews. 
Abbe sieyes, the spokesman for the third order, sug-
gested that the constitution should consult reason and set up 
a scientific machine whose perfection would ensure an efficient 
42 Append 1x IV 
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and lasting government. This would serve as an example to the 
other nations of the world. The other sohool of thought, led 
by Mounier, Lally-Tollendal, Bergasse, Clermont-Tonnere, and 
Malouet thought that a oonstitution was not a meohanioal and 
logioal work, but work whioh should oonsult experienoe more 
than reason. They pOinted to the example of England where a 
real oonstitution approved by long praotioe had realized for 
the people--11berty; therefore, would it be wise to rejeot this 
45 
established one, and seek a better imaginary one. They knew 
that they oould not transplant the oonstitution into Franoe, 
but proposed to make it their model and modify it to oonform to 
the oustoms and habits of Franoe., 
Although the two sohools were in agreement ooncerning 
the divisions of powers, they dld not interpret this separa-
tion in the same manner. For the first school, whioh is known 
as the abstraot sohool, the separation of powers meant an 
absolute and vigorous limitation of the funotions and duties 
of each of the three departments of government. Thus a barrier 
would be ereoted whioh would prevent the meeting of the differ-
ent powers. It a confliot arose, it oould not be settled by the 
departments of the government. This sohool tried to point out 
to Sieyes and his disoiples that so rigorous a separation was 
45 de Hauranne, 43-45 
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more practical in their heads than on paper. To all the ob-
jections, Sieyes responded that society ought to be organized 
on the model of the human body---the head thInks; the arm acts 
and executes, and one never encroaches on the functIon of the 
other.- Thus In society, the legIslative power 1s the head; 
the executive power is the arm; It would be absurd to mix them. 
However, Sleyes and hIs followers forgot that in the human body, 
the head and arms are part of a wlique being so organized that 
the head cannot execute its wishes without the arms, nor can the 
46 
arms refuse to obey the head. 
The men of the EnglIsh school had not fallen into suoh 
errors; they wished to dIvide the power, but still each depart-
ment would be able to aid, to control, and to moderate one an-
other reolprooally. They knew that a oonstitutional monarohy 
should be one of disoussion, transaction, and balanoe; and their 
good sense refused to admit the oonsequenoes of an absolute sep-
47 
aration of powers. 
It would be diffioult to olassify into one school or 
the other the majorIty of the citIzens of the Frenoh nation. 
When it was a questIon of proclaiming the principle of national 
sovereignty, of instItuting and guaranteeIng public lIbertIes, 
46 Ibid., 46-47 
47 Brissaud, 60 
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of substituting inequality for the injustices of the old regime, 
the deputies desired a constitution founded on reason. On the 
delicate question of the distribution and organizatIon of power, 
their ideas were confused and often contradictory; however, sincE 
they desired a constitutional monarohy more than anything else 
48 
they favored the plan of Mounier and his friends. 
Until 1789 all the power had been concentrated in the 
person of the King; nevertheless, when the idea of three dis-
tinct powers was introduced into the assembly, it did not meet 
any objection since the political ideals of Montesquieu were 
well known in France. The citizens knew very little about 
public affairs; therefore, when they found in books a formula 
which seemed to solve the1r difficult1es, they took it for ab-
solute truth. Such was the case with the political philosophy 
49 . 
of Montesquieu. He conceived the separation of powers as the 
fIrst condition of po11t1cal liberty. Montesquieu's political 
ideals of government are set forth in !a! Spirit ~ !h! ~ 
where he asserts the general proposition that the Constitution 
• 
most in conformity with nature is that whioh is best suited to 
48 
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the character ot the nation tor which It is intended. He be-
lieved that the salvation of France depended upon the possibil-
ity of undoing the work of Richelieu and LouIs XIV and ot re-
turning to the old monarchy as it existed under Henry IV or 
Louis XII. He would temper monarchy by aristocratic institu-
tIons, since he was convinced that all individual sovereignty 
was bad--whether in the hands ot one or many it would lead to 
50 
despotism and despotism to anarchy. Theretore, he prepared 
to prevent individual sovereignty trom becoming despotism, Din 
order that there may not be an abuse of power, power must check 
power.- All France desired would be now lost it the new Con-
stitution gave to the same man, or the same body ot nobles, or 
51 
to the people the exercise of all three powers. ThIs desire 
to limit the power of the sovereign distinguished Montesquieu 
from almost all political theorists ot his age. He held that 
monarchies perish ·when obedience becomes servile, when honor 
is no more, when the nobles are the despised instruments of the 
Prince, when the dishonorable and base are honored; when the 
monarch, abolishing all institutions and bodies intermediate 
between himself and his people, seeks to centralize all govern-
ment in himself." Such was the condition of France under Louis 
50 The cambrld!e Modern History, 18-19 
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XVI. He wanted the ConstitutIon o~ the old monarohy, if it 
existed, lito be rebuilt and enlarged on the plan o~ the British 
and Amerioan Constitutions. 1I That 1s that a check be placed on 
52 
the arbItrary power of the government. 
St111 stranger was the influence Rousseau exerted over 
the Assembly. In the Contract Soclal, the B1ble of the Assembly, 
he set forth an absolutely and rigid and impraoticable ideal. 
"Man is born free, and everywhere he is in chains i • are the open-
ing words of the Contract Soc1al. He ma1ntained that man makes 
a contract by which he agrees to live in SOCiety. He assumed 
that man 11ved first In a state of nature and that he escaped 
from th1s state through the soc1al contract. By this he means 
that man surrendered his rights to a community and promised to 
obey the sovereign to whom it would give those rights. He de-
sired the majorIty to scorn experience, to treat men as though 
they were all equivalent quantities, to mold and remold French 
53 
society through the will of the leg1s1ator. The Constitut10n 
of 1191 was not and could not be conformable to Rousseau's 
maxims, but it was Imbued with his spirIt. 
Among a mass of less memorable wrItings of the cahiers 
were a few of solid composition that left a mark on the policy 
and opInion of the assembly. The most outstanding of these 1s 
52 The cambr1d~e Modern Historl, 19-20 
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the famous "Qu'est-ce que le Tiers Etat?" of Abbe S1eyes. He 
asked and answered his own question--"What is the Third estate," 
he asked. "It 1s everything," he answered, "but hitherto the 
States General counted little. The third estate, as Sieyes had 
so often sa1d, was the "nation minus the nobles." It embraced 
almost all France, and it was neither a cast nor a political 
body. At one extreme, 1t touched the nobles, and at the other 
it plunged into the popular masses; and it was among these ranks 
that the ideas and the theories penetrated into legislation and 
renewed the face of French government. Sieyes was convinced 
that in h1S solitary meditations he had discovered the absolute 
55 
truth. Sieyes separated himself from Montesqu1eu by his love 
of equality and hatred of privilege; from Rousseau by his re-
spect for individual liberty and by his taste for a representa-
tive system. However, the arguments Sieyes presented for the 
defense of the third estate were logical under the present cir-
oumstanoes; the deputies oould give no retort. The Assembly 
then undertook its most arduous work--the reformation of the 
orown. 
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CHAPrER II 
ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE POWER 
• 
Since the time of St. Thomas Aquinas, the idea that 
sovere1gnty resides in the multitude, has been a truism of 
scholastic philosophy. It rests on the observation of the fact 
that 1n society the multitude will have the last word; if it 
is necessary to resort to force, as in battle, v1otory will go 
1 
to the greatest warriors. In the small cIt1es of the anc1ent 
world, the citIzens assembled and used their primitIve method 
of ostracism to remove opponents from office. But in the 
history of the great State of France, there was nothing to 
I 
warrant the view that sovereignty resided in the people. 
" The ancient regime was an absolute reign pushed to 
the extreme. When Louis XVI ascended the throne in 1774, he 
inherited a power nearly absolute in theory over his entire 
kingdom. Royalty was a power born In Itselr. It was a power-
in the eighteenth century which was synonomous wIth the King of 
France. By its origin and Its nature, it was essentially in-
defInIte, inflexible, capable of drawing away from, or adopting 
itself to the most dIverse situations. Royalty had its initial 
appearance at the close of the tenth century as a weak puny 
1 Brissaud, 537 
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faotor in society, and little by little, it had elevated itself 
until it could olaim the title of ~ grand rOi.at the end of 
2 
seven centuries. Although it had survived all the obstacles 
which fell across its path and had oonquered the feudal soo 1ety, 
it died suddenly at the end of the eighteenth century. 
It was a recognized maxim that royal will was law. 
The king concentrated in himself all sovereign authority and all 
power. He united the military and judicial powers, the legisla-
tive and administrative powers, so that he exercised direct and 
3 
despotic power over the nation. In certain parts of the coun-
try, the old assemblies still met at fixed times but their func-
tions were very closely lim1ted. The Parliaments, or high 
oourts of justice, which had claimed the right to impose some 
check on legislation had become the puppets of Louis XIV, and 
the principal one at Paris had been dissolved by Louis xv. 
Therefore, the royal prerogative of Louis XVI was theoretically 
whole and complete since every organ of the government was aux-
iliary to the crown and operative only within the discretion of 
4 
the King. In no part of the country was he a stranger,.for his 
name was inscribed at the head of all local sovereign acts as 
the name of a superior to whom they owed certain marks of defer-
ence. 
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The King's oouncils had inoreased to five and were 
truly the central governing power, although they did nothing in 
their own name. The King nominally settled every question with 
their advioe, but the final deoision rested with Louis XVI. 
Every important matter was subm1tted to him. Thus in the gov-
ernment of the oountry, the K1ng could at any moment take as 
much a burden upon his own shoulders as they were strong enough 
5 
to bear. These counoils had not been formed, as in England, 
by d1vision of duties but had become teohnical boards with a 
distant relation to the administration. 
Still the French people looked hopefully to the king 
for government and the neoessary measures of reform. Louis XVI 
was well meaning and anxious to rule; he was willing to work 
bard at bis royal duties in order to br1ng freedom to his 
people; his intentions were always good and his sense of duty 
6 
strong • However, they longed for a fair d1stribution of public 
burdens, rather than for a share in the government. Eaoh con-
stitution formed did not limit his powers; did not impose any 
rules on his actions; did not give to his subjects the rights 
they desired. The government was more rigid than absolute; it 
5 Lowell, 5-6 
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was intangible for those who lived under it. A King of France 
wbo had reigned justly and· strongly would have received the 
moral support of the most respectable part of his subjects; but 
Louis XVI was devoid of all greatness of character; there was a 
want of dignity about him which made it hard for him to rule: 
be was timid where he should have been bold, irresolute and weak 
7 
where he should have been strong. This characteristIc possibly 
accounts for the failure of his administration. Even at his 
deatb those who had lived under his despotic rule thought him 
honest and well-intentioned, but unequal to the situation in 
8 
wbich he was placed. Every monaroh 1s surrounded by many 
barriers which he must overcome, but Louis XVI had become so 
imbued with the aristocratic not1ons of his ancestors, so in-
censed by the prest1ge of his name, that he did not foresee the 
time when uncontrolled kings govern1ng with unlimited authority 
9 
was at an end. 
When the monarchy became oonscious that reforms were 
needed, and abuses had accumulated which required solving, it 
was incapable of introduoing these reforms. Vihen it could not 
7 ibid., 470-471 
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adapt itself to the new st'andard, a new force arose--public 
opinion. However, 1n this setting of despotism and aristocracy 
how could the idea of a political system which gave to the 
assembly the power of legislation, and placed the executive 
power in the agents of the King penetrate the mind of one who 
bad exercised the three functions of government through his 
10 
royal will. Nevertheless, the attitude of the government of 
1789 was liberal and certainly loyal to the King. Even as late 
as January 24, 1791, the government issued a set of proclama-
tions to prove that the sovereign was Uthe good king his sub-
jects desired him to be. "His majesty," they said, "has assem-
bled the States General ••• to preserve in regard to them the 
character which lies nearest to his heart--that of counsellor 
11 
and friend. II The word fI friend" must have touched the country 
deeply. This declaration might have been issued to strengthen 
the words of Louis XVI in the preamble to the letters of this 
convocation. 
We have need of the meeting of our faithful 
subjects to aid us • • • in establishing 
according to our wishes, a constant and in-
variable rule in all the branches of the 
government which concern the happiness of 
our subjects and the prosperity of our realm. 12 
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At this time however, were the essential elements necessary to 
form this new society present in the French government? Louis 
XVI, brought up in the rich ancestry of absolutism, would re-
gard this representative government as a hindrance to the leg1t~ 
Imate prerogatives which he held from his ancestors. To him, 
it seemed a great harm to the nobility on whom he was accustomed 
to lean. That Louis XVI was master and his will made the law 
13 
was universally accepted by all the nation. The admiration of 
the English Constitution was still rather theoretic than practi-
cal, and would not detract from the·loyalty undoubtedly felt for 
the French crown. 
The King was supposed to be absolute. Yet, the rep-
/ 
resentatives of the old regime made light of the declamations 
against the "despotism of the King." He was really the "chief 
slave" of a system of which he probably disapproved, but was 
powerless to modify. He was the official chief, but also the 
slave of his court, of his minIstry, of tradition; and his de-
14 
sire for li~erty was greater than that of his subjects. If he 
were a reformer in intention, the majority of his actions did 
not substantiate this belief. When Lally-Tollendal established 
the fact that the king should be an integral part of the 
13 de Hauranne, 25-26 
14 Madelin, 6 
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legislature, not only because it resulted from French tradition, 
but because it conformed to the nature of things, what chaos 
15 
must have existed in the mind of Louis XVI. The royal govern-
ment impatient with the abuses of the administration hurled it-
self from a powerless orystalized regime to a revolutionary 
16 
one. It ooncluded that a total destruction must precede a 
complete reconstruction; therefore, under the new foroe of publio 
opinion, divine right sovereignty disappeared from the government 
of France. The division and multiplication of powers substitut-
ed for the ooncentration of powers, and the regime of 1791 be-
came, therefore," a violent antithesis of the old order. 
After the insurrections of July in Paris and in the 
Provinces, and the fall of the Bastille, royal authority went to 
pieces. With it, according to Caryle, went afeudalism, despot-
17 
ism, ••• and all hard usage of man by his brother man.a These 
insurrections were open violent rebellion of freed anarohy 
18 
against hated authority. The old administrative system ended 
and many new municipalities were created. These same uprisings 
showed that no trust could be placed in the regular army, and 
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innumerable militia, devoted to the cause of the Revolution, 
19 
33 
appeared. The rising of the peasants, the burning of manor-
houses and manorial records led directly to the memorable de-
crees of August 4, when the feudal tenures and the privileges 
of orders, cities, and provinces were virtually abolished. The 
feudal courts of justice were swept away; and the royal Courts 
20 
of Justice were extinguished without any effort. All ancient 
historic divisions of France gave way to a new system of de-
partments, d 1stricts, and cantons. The c onf iscat ion of Church 
lands destroyed the wealth of the clergy, and the "civil const i-
21 
tution" caused a schism among their numbers. A wide and gen-
eral destruction of the old institutions was made by the Assem-
bly. It met little resistance as its adversaries were weak and 
timid. Society seemed to dissolve itself in order to receive 
22 
an entirely new pattern from the Assembly. The moral effect 
of these measures was most salutary for those who "deplored the 
horrors committed in the name of lIberty" and volunteers rose 
23 , 
in large numbers to defend the royalty of the ancien regime. 
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and 6th, the King and the Assembly were advised to leave Ver-
sailles and go to Paris, for they feared Louls XVI was again 
y1elding to the influenoes at the oourt whioh were hostl1e to 
reform. Here at Paris the revolutionists oould keep hlm under 
watoh; the oity was not only suspioious but also tendend toward 
v101enoe and brutality. It was then that the foroes were aooum-
ulated whioh produoed the Constitution and made Franoe a repub-
26 
lio. 
To understand the oourse of debates and exeoutl.e 
deorees that resulted in the short-lived oonstitution of 1791, 
it is neoessary tQ oonsider some of the partles in the Assembly. 
They appeared during the debates over the Constitutlonal quest-
ion as to whether or not the king oould veto the aots of the 
Assembly. Their names resulted from their position ln the 
Assembly hall in relation to the president. The Rlght, led by 
Mounier, was oomposed of those who favored the oonstitutional 
monarchy of England. The Center party were praotically neutral, 
and voted as they were influenced by publio expresslon of dis-
content. The Left was the most aotive division of the Assembly. 
It included many young nobles, the most noted of whom were 
... Slayas, Talleyrand; and La Fayette. This dlvlslon planned to 
26 Shalier Mathews The Frenoh Revolutlon. 
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sever themselves from the past, but at the same time to maintain 
27 
the monarchy. 
There was one man in the Assembly, although he did not 
claim membersh1p in any of the parties, Who saw the state of 
France as it actually existed. This was M1rabeau who will be 
remembered for what he attempted rather than what he accomplish-
ed in the first years of the Revolution. Although he was sus-
pected by all parties, he was recognized for his OPpos1t1on to 
absolutism, and his ability as a writer on political subjects. 
; 
He was bitterly opposed to the old regime, but saw that Franoe 
was incapable of a republican government, and, consequently, 
28 
urged a change to constitutional monarchy. He was unable to 
w1n over LaFayette and his followers to his plan in spite of his 
influenoe in the Assembly. As the revolution progressed and the 
Left seemed to gain viotory, the stronger did Mirabeau's desire 
beoome to restore Louis XVI to the favor of France. He urged 
Louis XVI to win baok the oonfidenoe of the nation by separating 
29 
himself from the upper order. Mirabeau wished that the King 
should have a veto power over the aots of the Assembly, but the 
people dreaded the oontinuanoe of absolutism and determined to 
27 Mathews, 154 
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weaken the power of the executive. Mirabeau did not trust the 
wisdom of collective bodies, or the polltioal intelligenoe of 
tbe middle classes; therefore, he supported the King as th~ 
guide and leader of France. The Assembly would not sanction any 
real power in the executive. Many were opposed to Mirabeauj and 
in order to be completely independent of royal influence during 
the formation of the constitution, the Assembly voted that no 
deputy should be allowed to receive office from the King. This 
aimed directly at Mirabeau, as the rumor had spread that Mirabeau 
was seeking a place in the parliamentary ministry. Although he 
urged Louis to repeal this measure, his efforts were in vain and 
the principle was embodied 'in the constitution. Monarchy had 
30 
been destroyed by the deputies. They sald the maxim of sep-
aration of powers kept the chiefs of the exeoutive from the leg-
is lature. 
The remodeling of the administrative system began with 
the sovereign. From the examinatIon of the oahlers, there were 
definite questions concerning the authority of the king which 
31 
needed a solution. Since the Assembly had deolared itself 
inseparable from the person of the King by moving from Versailles 
30 James H. Robinson (editor) Translations and Reprints from 
the Original Sources of Euroeean His£or~.--Y Un!versl~f 
PennsylVania PublicatIOn, P. S. King an Son, Philadelphia, 
1897, 9 
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to parls, it was almost as mUoh a prisoner as the King. The 
oonstitution preserved the heredltary monarohy but set limits 
to the power of the King in aooordanoe with the formula of the 
separation of powers of Montesquieu. It deslgnates the King as 
premier fonotionaire publio. He is no longer the exeoutive 
-
power itself, but is now the ohief person to exeoute orders 
given to him by the oonstitution. In the parliament, in the 
clubs, in the newspapers, and even in the diotionary the word 
!2! was abandoned, and in its plaoe had been substituted pouvoir 
exeoutif. Now he reigned in virtue of heredity, but not in the 
32 
name of the law. All that he stood for was lost to publio 
worship when he oeased to oommand reverenoe and obedienoe. Tbe 
Assembly was inexperienoed in the art of politios; and in ex-
cluding royalty from oonst1tutional power, it plaoed LOUis XVI 
1n a subordinate situation, and took from oourt its glory in 
the anoient regime. Therefore, agreement between the King and 
the Assembly, which was always desired but not always managed 
33 
wisely, beoame very diffioult. 
The powers and rights of the king as enumerated 1n the 
constitut1on made him a mere honorary clerk isolated in his 
32 Legg, 321-322 
33 Helie, 20-21 
39 
34 • 
palace. If the nation did not have the right to remove him, 
there were cases in which he was considered as having abdicated. 
For example, in the spring of 1790, Louis XVI had ordered some 
of the French fleet to the territory of Nootka Sound 1n North 
Amerioa to help settle the dispute between England and Franoe 
over the region. Spain claimed the help of France under the 
Family Compact, and this claim was acknowledged by Louis XVI 
and his ministers. He hoped the Assembly would support him be-
cause of the anoient enmity against England; however, his hopes 
were in vain, for the Assembly, disregarding the immed1ate need, 
deoided that if treaties were acts of sovereign power, then no 
treaty could be valid without the expressed oonsent of the 
people. Since none of the treaties of France had reoeived ex-
35 
pressed oonsent of the people, none of them could be binding. 
Mirabeau urged that the King should still have the power of de-
claring war and peace, but the Assembly favored the proposal 
which placed this power 1n the hands of the Legis lature. The 
Assembly gave a new proof of 1ts resolution to keep foreign 
affairs 1n its own charge when it cancelled the permission given 
34 APpendix IV 
35 H. Morse Stephens (editor) 
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by the Ministers to Austrian troops to pass through France to 
Belgium. Spain became distrustful of France and made terms with 
Great Britain yielding all the points they had disputed. The 
weakness of the French crown was now as powerful in foreign 
affairs as in domestic affairs. The Assembly acknowledged the 
nation liable for the King1s debts as they feared the emergen-
cies of foreign affairs would enable it to regain some of its 
36 
power and dignity. 
The constitution gave to the King the exercise of the 
executive power, and a very limited share of the legislative 
power. He appointed ambassadors and negotiated with foreign 
nations, but these negotiations were subject to the ratification 
37 
of the legislative body. He was supreme head of the army, but 
he could appoint only the superior military commanders and could· 
give no orders to the National Guard. He was likewise the high-
est authority in the administrative system, but the appointment 
38 
of administrative and judicial officers did not belong to him. 
In reality, the King was merely the person to whom royal author-
ity had been delegated hereditarily; he could be truly styled 
King of the French people by the grace of God and the constitu-
tional law of the state. The crown was indivisible and trans-
36 The Cambridge Modern History, 190 
37 APPend!x IV 
38 Br1ssaud, 550-551 
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m1tted through the male line aooording to the law of primogeni-
39 
ture. His ministers, seleoted outside the assembly, were only 
admitted to 1t for the purpose of giving information and answer-
ing questions. All secondary and looal author1ties--judges, 
administrators of departments and distriots, mayors and mun1c1-
pal officers--all, from the greatest to the least were elected. 
The K1ng stood for the exeoutive power, but he had no executive 
agents. Every order of the K1ng had to be counter-signed by a 
min1ster, and the ministers were respons1ble, while the K1ng 
40 
was irresponsible. Gouverneur Morris visited the Assembly on 
November 20, 1790 while the const1tution was being made and ex-
presses h1s opinion of it thus: "The Almighty Himself could not 
make it work unless He created a new species of man. Lafayette 
is assailed by doubts. M1rabeau declared that the disorganiza-
41 
t10n of the kingdom could not have been better planned." 
In spite of the King's submissive behavior, as he had 
shown no opposition to any measures adopted by the A,ssembly, the 
executive was still looked upon as an enemy. He still appeared 
too formidable; therefore, in order to prevent h1m from taking 
39 In France, the exclusive r1ght of inheritanoe belonging to 
the first-born son. 
40 Pierre Gaxotte The French Revolution. 
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action, he was rendered suspect. Everything he d1d was de-
nounced as useless or 1nterpreted as a plot. The bead of all 
pub11c documents estab11shed the h1erarcby of authority in 
France--"The NatIon--The Law--The K1ng." If he used the powers 
left to him, the nation declared he was ~busing them. He was 
in a position of marked 1nferiority to the Assembly, for he 
oould not dissolve it; the appeal to the people was d~nIed to 
42 
bim. 
He was tbe head of the admlnistrati~n, but how could 
be rule min1sters who were elected by the natIon, and whom he 
could neither dIsmiss or suspend from theIr functions. "The 
Assembly," writes Mirabeau, "has not created any executive 
power ••• I maintain that no power can ex1st without agents 
43 
and w1tbout organs.- The Assembly turned the King Into Its 
chief servant, but did not grant this servant the poss1bi.1Ity· of 
serv1ng well. 
While these general prinoiples regard1ng the change 
in executive power were being debated, the question of the King 'IS 
acceptance of the constitution brought a new problem before the 
Assembly. Some remarked tbat the King might refuse the constI-
tutIon and thus act agaInst the general desire of France. 
42 Madelin, 120-121 
43 ~., 123 
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M. Redon tried to prove that the Assembly had no right to even 
think that the King's approval was necessary. The fact that 
the oahiers demanded it was sufficient to guarantee its accept-
ance. Considering his critioal position in the eyes of the na-
tion, Louis XVI would not have the right to set himself against 
the establishment of the revolution, that is, against the lib-
erty of his people; he must sign and ratify the constItution 
44 
for himself and his successors. 
On February 4, 1790, Louis XVI unexpeotedly came to 
the Assembly and after a short speech, in his own name and that 
of the queen and his young son, sQlemnly took the oath to abide 
by the Constitution whioh was being produced. Formerly, Louis 
XVI had refused to promulgate isolated fragments of the consti-
tution, but had acoeded to the "resolutions of August 4 on con-
dition that no attempt to diminish his exeoutive power was 
45 
made. Now in February, Louis XVI was painfully reSigned to 
the weakening of royal power. 
Being informed of the adhesion of the 
great majority to the constitution, I 
now announce that I have relinquished 
any claim to assist in that work; and 
that when I, respons1ble to the nation 
alone, thus abandon that claim, no one 
44 Andrews, 28-35 
45 Thompson, 105 
• 
else has the right to feel aggrieved • • • 
When I shall have loyally put in operation 
all the means plaoed at my disposal, no re-
proaoh oan be laid to my oharge, and the 
nation whose interest alone ou~ht to serve 
as a guide, w1ll express itself by the 
means reserved to it by the Constltution.46 
After the Assembly had depr1ved Lou1s XVI of all 
44 
active power and had established h1s position as exeoutor of 
the laws of the Assembly, the leaders saw that the Revolution 
could not end until the exeoutive had regained some power. 
This hope, however, was lost by the oonst1tution. For some time 
the members of the oommittee had debated the question of the 
King's veto. On this question great interest oentered. Shall 
the KIng have an absolute veto? or a lImIted, a suspensive veto? 
or no veto whatever? were the quest10ns of the day in Franoe. 
In the journals, the olubs, the distriots and on the streets, 
47 
the veto was oalled the re-establishment of despotism. 
In the provinoes and in Paris there was proof of the 
ignoranoe of the people oonoern1ng the veto. The veto was oon-
sidered in the provinoes as the "most oruel tax" that oould be 
introduoed 1nto Franoe. In Paris also, they mIstook it for a 
46 
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tax. Baronass de Staal in the Consideration ~ the Frenoh B!!-
olution states "they spoke of the v~e in the streets of Paris, 
- 48 
as of a monster that would devour little ohildren." 
The veto was the popular desoription of what finally 
appeared in the oonstitution under the heading ]! !! Sanotion 
49 
royale. Sanotion had been in use for oenturies, but has had 
-
varioUS meanings. M. GUillatin, substItuting the word "oonsent" 
for that of "sanotion" proposed a draft of four artioles to de-
termine the degree of power to be plaoed in the" hands of the 
King. 
1. May the King refuse his oonsent to the oonstitution? 
2. May the King refuse his consent to acts of the leg-
islative body? 
3. In oase the King should refuse his consent, is this 
refusal to be suspensive or limited? 
4. In oase the King1s refusal is suspensive how long may 
this refusal cont1nue--dur1ng one or two legislatures? 
On M. GuI11atin i s first question there was no need of 
deliberating. On the seoond questIon, the result of the vot"es 
were 730 for the affirmative, 143 for the negative, 76 not vot-
ing. The third questIon was then put to a vote, and it was on 
this one that the greatest interest centered. All admitted 
48 Andrews, 32 
49 Appendix IV 
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royal sanction in order to g1ve force to the laws; it was a 
matter of deciding whether the refusal of the King should be 
50 
suspensive or unlimited. In the last analysiS Lally-Tollendal 
stated that to question whether the King's veto shall be sus-
pensive or absolute is to question "whether there shall be a 
King, and the liberty of the nation requires a King, requires 
51 
the King's prerogative, requires the K1ng's sanction." M1ra-
beau supported the absolute veto with all his influence; Mounier 
gave his approval to this also; Lafayette, in imitation "of the 
~ Uhited states proposed the suspens1ve veto; S1eyes would admIt 
no veto. It had been assumed by him and all other members of 
the Assembly that the King and the King's ministers would be the 
exeoutive power in the new constitutIon, but 1t had never been 
anticipated that they would be given power limited or unlimited 
in the proceedings of the legislature. The principle of separa-
tion of powers they were tr~ing to introduce would be violated 
seriously by this action. 
The question of the royal sanotion was then considered 
from all angles by the Assembly. The sanction of the King of 
England is absolute. That of the PresIdent of the United States 
is limited. Now the aristocraoy made their last desperate stand 
50 Stephens. A History of the Frenoh Revolution, 201 
51 Andrews; '3'4 - - -
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and fought fiercely. Many of the popular party, alarmed in 
view of the rapid progress of events advocated an absolute veto. 
Its inconsistency, however, wIth all enlightened principles of 
liberty was too apparent to be concealed. If the principle of 
the separation of powers were rigidly applied, the King must be 
refused the smallest measure of legislative power. The fate of 
liberty seemed to depend upon this question, as the absolute 
veto would enable the court, through the King, to annul every 
52 
popular measure. 
Now the impulsive temper of the Assembly dominated and 
men were anxious to express their feelings. Those, who like 
Mounier, valued English precedents proposed that the King should 
have the power of vetoing any measure passed by the new legisla-
ture. They seem to have forgotten that the King of England had 
53 
in reality lost the power of rejecting bills. The only real 
check upon legislation in England is the responsibility of the 
Cabinet which controls the majority in the House of Commons. 
Mlrabeau supported the absolute veto and expressed his views in 
the debate of June 15. 
Wben it becomes a question of the royal 
prerogative, that is ••• the most precious 
possession of the people. I believe the 
veto of the king is so necessary, that .i£ 
52 Abbot, 149 
53 Stephens,! History ~ ~ French Revolution, 200 
he did not possess it, I would rather 
live in Constantinople than in France. 54 
48 
Mirabeau had gone back to Montesquieu's words, "It the execut ive 
power has no means of arresting the enterprise of the legisla-
tive body, the latter will,become despotio; able to increase its 
own powers contInually, it will finish by annihIlating all other 
powers. 1I He continues his debate thus: 
Yes, I declare It, I know of nothing more 
to be dreaded than the sovere1gn aristo-
cracy of 600 persons, who being able to-
morrow to deolare themselves irremovable 
and the day after heredItary will finish 
like aristocrats allover the world by 
usurping everyth1ng.55 
Mirabeau felt, that if the veto was rejected supreme exeoutive 
power would pass from the King to the Assembly, and France 
would then have 1200 tyrants instead of one. The veto, he de-
clared, gave the people, through the K1ng, the means of check1ng 
56 
their own representatives. Mirabeau sensed he was maintaining 
an unpopular cause, and refrained from voting in the f1nal de-
cision although the veto was advocated by h1m 1n all his Influ-
57 
ence. 
54 
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tbiS beated debate. ~ieyes, the famous spokesman for the third 
estate, spoke against allowing the King any veto whatsoever. 
III define the law as tbe will of the governed: therefore the 
governing ought not to have any part in its formation." The 
functions of the legislature should never be assumed by the 
king under any title whatsoever. Another of his famous maxims, 
lithe Assembly is the head, the king 1s the arm" proves he would 
58 
not admit any species of veto. He held the view that an 
assembly was 1n a batter position than a king to know the mind 
of the nation; that the business of the executive was to carry 
out the w11l of the legislature not to obstruct it; and that a 
royal veto on the proceedings of a national assembly is nothing 
less than a lettre 2! cachet 1ssued against the w1ll of the 
people. Lafayette, who had been influenced by the Amerioan pre-
cedent, wrote to Necker and Mounier 1n favor of the suspensive 
veto, warning them of the disaster which might occur if they 
59 
tried to obtain more for the king. The people of Paris as 
Barnave, Duport, Lameth, and Alexandre, were more vehemently 
opposed to the royal veto than those who sat in the Assembly. 
They undertook the situation quite clearly; for if in normal 
58 de Hauranne, 80 
59 Peter Kropotkin The Great French Revolution. 
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times, the power of the King to check a decision of the parlia-
ment loses much of its importance, it is quite another thing in 
a revolutionary period. In ordinary times, a parliament would 
seldom pass anything that the King would have to veto in the 
interest of the privileged classes; while during a revolutionary 
period, the decisions of a parliament may often tend towards the 
destruction of ancient privileges, and consequently encounter 
60 
oppoSition from the King. Mounier was unshaken; but Necker 
and some of his colleagues told their friends in the House, that 
unless the absolute veto could be carried by a decisive major-
ity, it would be better to vote for the suspensive veto. Among 
hIs opponents, Mounier had some private frIends who opened nego-
tiations with him. They proposed to accept his absolute veto 
and two Houses, if in return the Senate should have only a sus-
pensive veto on the acts of the representatives, and that the 
convention be held periodically to revise the constItution. 
61 
Tbese offers were signs of weakness. 
During the debates on this subject it appeared, that 
the majority of the members were so apprehensive of a return of 
the old tyranny, that they were so solicitous to secure the 
60 Ibid., 148 
61 Acton, 111 
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legislative power from the attempts of the executive, that they 
seem to have forgotten that it was a monarchical constitution 
.bich they had professed to establish, and weakened the executive 
62 
power to such a degree as almost to render it useless. The 
question might have been debated forever; but on September 11, 
after transactions none too clear, it became known that the King 
would consent to promulgate the resolutions of August 4, if be 
were granted a valid veto for two sessions. Under this gentle-
man's agreement, the suspensive veto became part of the consti-
tution the same day. That the king should have a veto was re-
solved by 730 voices to 143; that the veto should be merely 
63 
suspensive was passed by 673 voices to 325. 
It had, in fact, been carrIed less by the arguments 
of the speakers than by urgency of the polItical sItuation, 
since another attack on the capital was feared. "The veto n , 
they declared, ttbelongs to no individual but to twenty-five 
million people." The leaders of agitation were determined to 
resist the threats of Paris. In so strained a situation, the 
deputies were willing to trust the King, to close the debate, 
and to compromIse on a suspensive veto. The,oretical passions 
62 John Moore A View of the Causes and Progress of the French 
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and revolutionary instincts prevailed over philosophical or 
political reasons; the national pride resented any imitation of 
the English constitution; the prinoiple of the absolute veto was 
64 
rejected. 
The suspensive veto meant that if the King refused to 
sign a measure, the act could not be brought up again in that 
assembly; but if it were passed without alteration in the two 
~ollowing assemblIes, it became a law without his consent. The 
~eto might be applied not only to long-term constitutional laws 
~ut also to routine decrees by which the assembly was remodeling 
, 
~he old regime, and dealIng with the emergenoies of the hour. 
~us by this substantial check upon his power, the King had im-
pressed upon himself and all the world that his position was now 
~ subordinate and a regulated one. 
When the Assembly had reconstructed the power of the 
~xecutive, it addressed the French people to give them confIdence 
~hat a constitutIon was being formed to assure their liberty 
~orever. It emphasized partIcularly that monarchy, so dear to 
all the Frenoh, had been retained, but at the same time the 
rights which the nation had lost to deoree its taxes and laws 
had been restored. 
~4 Guizot, 32 
We have destroyed the power of the executive--No, say 
rather the power of the ministers, which in reality 
formerly destroyed or often degraded the executive 
power. We have enlightened the executive power by 
showing it its true rights; we have above all enabled 
it by traoing it to the true souroe of its power, the 
power of the people. The executive power is now with-
out foroe - against the constitution and the law, that 
is true, but in support of them, it will be more pow-
erful than ever before.65 
Although Louis XVI reoognized the oonstitutional 
53 
power officially, he saw in it only a usurpation of his royal 
authority of whioh he did not wish any reduotion. Even to the 
last moment he never abandoned the hope of one day reduoing to 
obedience this new power which he reproaohed himself for having 
allowed it to grow by the side of his own. The Assembly, in 
~eality, had given the king much greater power than the President 
of the United States possesses. A two-thirds vote of both houses 
can immediately carry any measure against the veto of the Presi-
dent. 
Sometimes the French Revolution has been attributed 
~o the influence of the Amerioan Revolution, and there is no 
~oubt that the establishment of the independence of the colonies 
~rom Great Britain hastened the Revolution; but the movements 
~ere made by entirely different peoples. The enumeration of the 
rights of man came from America, and the American Declaration of 
p5 Robinson, 21-23 
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Independenoe oontains some of the abstraot theories of Frenoh 
philosophers whioh burst forth in 1789. The Deolaration of 
Independenoe was entirely the work of Jefferson, and therefore, 
66 
was influenoed by Frenoh writers. Also the history of repub-
lican ideas had been ~ead by all enlightened Frenchmen in the 
Constitution of the United States. This constitution had organ-
ized the rule of separation of powers and had given to publio 
law a precision and a fixity unknown to the anc1e~ regime. In 
the United States the oonstitutional dootrine that no political 
organ possesses inherent powers is fundamental. The exeoutive 
as well as the legislative and judicial branches derive their 
powers from the same souroe--the people. The branches of gov-
ernment are separate, and in a large measure independent of one 
another in the operations. Frenoh writers had sought refuge in 
England and found there freedom of thought and speeoh. They aiso 
found a free government in which the king and the court were not 
absolute, but in whicb a national legislature oontrolled the 
state and determined who should be the ministers, and under 
which public burdens were borne by all classes alike. When they 
returned to France they made known their disoovery. However, 
66 "France before the Revolution of 1789." (author unknown) 
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the French did not borrow English institutions at the outset, 
but it gave them a living example of the results which they might 
hope to reach if they could first make the government over. 
France, now had adopted this instrument of government, but her 
greatest problem was to distribute the powers without weakening 
67 
the general government. She had subordinated the executive, 
and now turned her attention to the organization of the legis la-
ture. 
67 Bernard Roelher liThe Constitutions of France, Monarchical 
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-CHAPTER III 
ORGANlZA'l'ION OF THE LEGISLATIVE BODY 
• 
When the Assembly passed the Declaration of the Righte 
of Man, they acted in harmony for the last time. The establish-
ment of principles did not involve agreement in policy; but when 
the time carne to apply these principles to the constitut1on, 
division arose among the members of the assembly. Nevertheless, 
all parties adhered strictly to the pr1nciple established by the 
1 
Rights of Man, that the nation transmits power. The Const1tu-
tion preserved the hereditary monaroh, .but in the organization 
of the leg1slative department the Assembly desired to limit the 
powers of the king in aocordance with Montesquieu's formula for 
the separation of powers which had been introduoed into the 
United States. The debates on the Deolaration of the Rights of 
Man had shown the strong line of demarcat10n between the support-
ers of different philosophical writers. However, when the or-
ganization of the legislature was proposed Political differences 
began to appear. The over-emphasis upon legislation which the 
Constitution of 1791 shows was a reflection of the dominant 
spirit of the assembly. 
1 Acton, 109 
r 57 
From time to time, the questIon is often asked by a 
stranger 'passing through a country, "who makes the law?" and 
then in turn "what are the principal objects of these laws?" 
In ancient law, if the formula has been transmitted correctly, 
the documents are silent on the participation of the people in 
the formation of the ordinances. In the documents emanating 
~rom the King during the Middle Ages, there 1s no mention of 
~epresentation in makIng the laws. However, these royal ord1-
2 
pances sometimes did not merit the name of law. 
A letter addressed to the Sequin, the Archbishop of 
~ens, illustrates the fact that if the King himself in the early 
penturies did not pass legislation then the nobility assumed 
~his duty. It further states that thIS 1s a tradition greater 
~han Hugh Capet. The last Caroling1ans promulgated only a small 
p.umber of laws and this weakness 1n legislative power continued 
~der the Capet1ans. It 1s said that Hugh Capet followed the 
~oyal custom of promulgating laws; but if he d1d, they have never 
3 
peen found. During the M1ddle Ages, also, the King rarely acted 
~lone. He promulgated the general ord1nances and legislated in 
lommon with the lords; although the law was issued in the name of 
~he King, it had been accepted beforehand by the suzerains. 
~ Vi ollet, 189 
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During the thirteenth oentury, Beaumanoir, one of the 
theorists of the day, fails to mention the dependenoe of the 
King on the vassals, but on the other hand he does not attribute 
the prinoiple of full legislative power to the King. Aooording 
to Beaumanoir, general oounoils suoh as ~ Grand Conseil (The 
Great Counoil) were established. At the olose of the thirteenth 
oentury, this was the only one that remained of all that onoe 
had been of suoh great importanoe in the early twelfth and thir-
teenth oentury. The courts did not disappear entirely in this 
century, but they beoame soaroer and scarcer and soon disappeared 
The power exeroised by St. Louis during this century, 
without a doubt, oontributed to the development of a centralized 
authority. The feudal barons beoame oonscious of the end to 
whioh the development of the monarchy was leading and they saw 
the neoessity to resist since their demands would have oompletely 
overthrown the monarohy and restored old feudal independenoe. 
However, Louis IX had been arbitrator between the Count of 
Provenoe, and the Count of Toulose, and later between the King 
of England and his barons. In addition, his high moral standard 
and his military aohievements made him greatly esteemed among 
other Christian princes, and thus he conquered his royal domain 
with an authority unknown to predeoessors. Therefore, at the 
end of the thirteenth oentury, the King had assumed sufficient 
59 
• 
power to make the greater part of his kingdom accept his orders 
4 
and decisions. 
Toward the middle of the fourteenth century, the King 
had established a group of offices, such as the Parlement, and 
the Chamber of Accounts in order to assure the regularity of 
business during his administration. As it often happens, the 
actions of the King were assumed by these assemblies, and the 
instruments which he had created for good became impediments to 
his reign. Thus the King was hindered by his own officers. On 
the other hand, he gave directly to the Cbancellor, a control 
over certain acts which should have been reserved for bis own 
good. Thus, there rose up around the throne diverse groups, 
formed of elements whose resistance marred tbe flexibility of 
5 
tbe king. 
During the Middle Ages, law was an ideal whicb not 
only represented tbe wisdom of past centuries, but served as the 
connecting link between tbe present and the past. Tbe sovereign 
power of tbe Middle Ages was not to cbange the law, but to assure 
1ts respect; if, therefore, the law of anc1ent times bad been 
modified, it was tbe duty of tbe King to re-establish it witbout 
4 
5 
Lowell, 89 
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altering the established customs of the country. TOday law is 
regarded as anything which has been voted and promulgated accord-
ing to a constitution. The fathers of anoient law did not give 
this free interpretation to the word. In France, loi was used 
only on rare oocasions and signified the oommand of authorIty; 
it guarded a very speoial treasure for the nation. For less 
important measures, the word~, meaning a deoree, was used. 
In the late r.uddle Ages, law was made: . one did not make law. 
The theory regarding the promulgation of law was that wisdom and 
experienoe were the two fundamental prinoiples neoessary to 
assure the people of a just law. Therefore, the King was to 
sense the needs of the people and issue laws which would give 
security to the people without presenting this law to the scrut1-
6 
py of an assembly. 
The first movement for representation in the forma-
tion of law began in the provInces. The King authorized and rat-
ifIed their deorees and in thIs way contributed to the exterior 
life of the people; the de put1es inf luenced the deorees, but it 
was the people who made the ordinances. Thus during the Middle 
~ges, the theory concerning the participation of the people in 
~he formation of law was a minor problem to the king; but after 
1789 when it became a reality it resulted in a great re-organlza-
~ Viollet, 200 
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tion in the legislative system of France. 
When the assembly had secured the Position of the 
executive, it turned its attention to the organization of the 
legislative body of the nation. In a substantial discourse in 
the principles of representative monarchy, Lally-Tollendal es-
tablished the fact that the King ought to be an integral part 
of the legislature, not only because it resulted from French 
tradition but because it conformed to the nature of affairs. It 
had been agreed that the legislative power had been controlled 
not by the King himself, but by the councils. All the initia-
tive of legislation rested with them, and by them, all laws were 
7 
shaped and drafted. It was not agreed whether their edicts 
possessed full force of law without the assent of the high courts 
or parliament. 
As many plans had been proposed for the Declaration 
of the Rights of Man, so too there were many for the formation 
of the new legislative power. Lally-Tollendal suggested the 
following: 
1. That the legislative body ought to 
be composed of three parties-- a 
King, a senate, and a House of Re-
presentatives. 
7 Lowell, 6 
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2. That the King ought to have the right of 
convoking the legislative body at certain 
times fixed by the constitutIon, and of 
prolonging it or dissolving it, and of 
calling another when one adjourns. 
3. That the sanction ought to belong to the 
King, and the 1nitiative exclus1vely to 
one chamber or another. All bills for 
revenue ought to originate in the House 
of Representatives. 
4. That the House of Representatives ought 
to be the sole accuser, and the Senate 
the solitary judge of public officials. 
The acousatlon, the trias' and the judg-
ment ought to be pub11c. 
62 
Mounier then came forward with his plan for the organ-
ization of the legislative body. He suggested: 
1. That NatIonal assemblies would be perma-
nent and would convene every year on 
December, and sit for four months. 
2. That royal sanction would be neoessary 
for all future legislative acts, but not 
for the pending oonstitution. 
3. That taxes would be levied for a limIted 
time only. 
4. That the legislature would be separated 
into a Senate and a House of Representa-
tives. 
5. That France would be div1ded into distriots 
of 150,000,000 inhabitants from which one 
representative chosen by the elected dep-
uties would be named as delegate to the 
assembly for three years. 
6. That neither the ministers of the King nor 
his representatives in the province could 
be chosen delegates. 
7. That royal orders be prohibited. 
8. That the King would have the power of disso-
lution and the power to oall a royal session. 
9. That the initiative would belong exolusively 
to the legislative body. 
~ Arthur Young Travels in France. George Bell and Sons, 
New York, 1889, 150 
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10. That revenue laws be introduced in the 
Senate, and that it be permitted to 
cbange the laws after they had been voted 
upon by the house. 9 
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During the session of the Assembly from August 27, 
1789 until October, 1'789, the permanance of the Assembly, the 
division into two bodies, and the royal veto were discussed. 
The Moderates or Liberals who were predominant in the work of 
the constitution hoped by the division of powers and the multi-
plication of checks to make their cou?try\as free as England 
or America. Mounier possessed the necessary tact; Clermont 
Tormerre and Lally-Tol.lenda1 were gifted orators; Ma1ouei.. was 
10 
their cautious adviser. fbey desired to control the repre-
sentatives by a second chamber, by the royal veto, and by the 
right of dissolution. 
In his report to the assembly, the Bishop of Bordeaux 
urged the members to center their attention on two important 
questions relating to the composition and organization of the 
legislative body. The first question was whether the body 
should be periodic or permanent. The majority of the cahiers 
suggested a recurrent assembly, but the committee had voted 
unanimously for a permanent body. Agreement on this question 
had been reached, since they feared that if the legislative 
9 de Hauranne, 71-73 
10 Acton, 109 
64 
• 
power acted by fits and starts every three or five years, the 
stability of the state would be threatened. At each convoca-
tion, the general excitement would cause a disturbance in public 
tl"B.hquflllty, while its intermittent character vvould encourage 
the introduction of abuses and France would once again fall into 
11 
the power of ministers. The assembly would not only meet 
every year but would continue to exist from one meeting to an-
other. 
The opinion of the committee was not equally decided 
on the composition of the legislative body. Should this Nation-
al Congress meet in one chamber or in two was the all absorbing 
question. The advocates of a single chamber felt they could 
rely with confidence upon the example of the one in which they 
were assembled. The good works resulting from it were already 
12 
eVident. They further urged that it is common will which 
makes the law, and it is at its best in a Single chamber; any 
division of the legislative body would destroy its unity and 
thus render impossible the best institutions and the most salu-
tary reforms. The division of the assembly, they urged, would 
produce a condition of discord and strife, and political inertia 
would emanate from this. AS a result, France would once more be 
exposed to the dangers of a new aristocracy which it wished to 
11 Andrews, 38 / 
12 Alexis C. Tocquevi lle L1ancien re~ime et la revolution. 
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avoid. The representatives stated logically that the branches 
of government were being organized according to the desires of 
the nation as expressed in the cahiers. The people understood 
that a second chamber in a revolution was impossible since it 
could only act when the revolution was exhausted and a period of 
reaction had set in. Thus they asked unity in the legislative 
14 
power. 
Others, on the contrary, held that the division of the 
legislative body into two chambers was necessary to prevent all 
deception and haste and to assure maturity of deliberations. 
England and America were again used to show the utility of two 
chambers. It 1s true, they said, that in a time of reorganiza-
tion a single body is pr~ferred, but for the constitution which 
had just been established two chambers were neC,essary to pre-
serve and stabilize this document. The nation was trying to 
abolish the intervention of the King in legislation, but com-
pared to the resistless force of a single chamber expressing the 
desire of the nation, the 'King1s interference would be worthless 
15 
and ineffective. One chamber, they pOinted out, might influ-
ence the King to alter the legislative system and, consequently, 
13 Andrews, 16-17 
14 Kropotkin, 147 
15 Andrews, 17 
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bring new uprisings to the nation. One body might easily be 
encouraged to reach decisions either by ministers directed 
against them, or by intrigue; and the faulty legislation result-
ing from these hasty decisions would shortly lead back to the 
old despotism or new anarchy. However, they added that in the 
division of the legislative body the distinction of orders 
should be abolished, for the dangers of aristocracy were to be 
16 
more feared since now they would have the seal of legality. 
Mounier, as reporter of the committee, recommended 
that there should be two chambers in the new French legislature 
as there were in England; but before any explanation was made of 
the proposed chambers a very warm debate arose. Although there 
were many admirers of English institut10ns 1n France, they were 
greatly outnumbered in the Assembly by those Frenchmen who 
thought it derogatory to copy England and who wished to present 
17 
something very original and very perfect by themselves. 
Mounier held that sovereignty resides in the nation, but oper-
ates through delegates aPPOinted or elected by the people. If 
these representatives have no other check than the executive 
power, they may pass among themselves unwise legislation. Two 
16 Andre ws, 18 
17 Hippolyte A. Taine The French Revolution. I Henry Holt and 
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ohambers deliberately separated assures the oontrary. 
The great majority of the earlier leaders of the 
Assembly were, like Mounier, in favor of the two chambers. 
Lally-Tollendal insisted on the division of the legislative and 
the unity of the exeoutive. ]n order to obtain equilibrium in 
the government, eaoh ohamber should have a partioular interest 
independent of the general interest oommon to both ohambers, 
and at the same time be part of the whole system. Unity, swift-
ness, and flexibility are the essenoe of exeoutive power; there-
fore, it should be oonoentrated in one hand. Deliberation, slow 
ness, and stability ought to oharaoterize the legislative power; 
19 
therefore, it should be divided. 
Before the division of the legislature was deoided 
upon, new debates arose on the organization of this National 
Congress. If it should meet in two ohambers, would the upper 
house be an aristooratio, hereditary body like the House of 
Lords in the British Parliament, or an eleotive republioan Sen-
20 
ate, as in the Amerioan Congress. The people would not oonseni 
to an hereditary House of Lords, whioh would be an impregnable 
18 de Hauranne, 72 
19 Ibid., 69-70 
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fortress for the illegal seizure of royal power. They were in-
olined to agree upon an upper house to be composed exclusively 
of the clergy and the nobles, but to be elected by the people. 
They were opposed to an election of the upper house even by the 
nobles and the clergy, for the high lords and great dignitaries 
of the Church looked down upon the lower nobility and the work-
21 
ing people. 'Ithe masses of people became more and more irri-
tated and clamored for a single chamber. 
Lally-Tollendal also proposed an organization of a 
second ohamber. He would have an upper house open to nobles, 
clergy, and deputies since a,separation of orders no longer 
existed, but his problem arose over the selection of these rep_ 
resentatives. If the people elected them, many members of the 
Assembly would be insulted. If the King seleoted them, great 
power would be given to him. Therefore, as a compromise, he 
would give the King the right of selecting the Senate from a 
list of candidates drawn up by the provincial assemblies. In 
this marmer, the senators would neither be hereditary nor 
elected temporarily; they would be elected for life. Thus the 
upper house would have neither the mobility of an eleotive 
chamber, nor the immobility of the aristooracy, and the problem 
22 
would be solved. 
---------
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Those who opposed the veto were as violent against the 
tWO houses. They feared that the influenoe of the court would 
at some time or another form the upper hquse and make it hered1-
tary. They refused to see all the advantages of the British 
23 
ponst1tution, and declaimed against its abuses. Perhaps the 
proposal of two chambers might have been carried had it not met 
with strong opposition from a quarter where it was least expect. 
ed--from the nobles themselves wbo were against an upper chamber 
because of their Situations and their opinion. From the "super-
abundant noblesse" of France, only a small portion could be 
chosen to form an upper ohamber. Many of those, who saw little 
probability of becoming members of this house, could not bear to 
see those who were their equals, or perhaps inferior, obtain a 
place in the upper chamber; therefore, they were ag1~t the 
24 
~easure • 
, 
Others of the nobility 1magined that those who had 
~irst jOined the Third Estate would be promoted, and they became-
irate when they considered that men, whom they considered trai-
tors, would be placed at the head of a chamber as a reward for 
their deed. Some of the higher orders were opposed to the Revo-
lution in any form, and believed that this regulation would give 
23 Ibid., 416 
~4 YOtiIig, 48 
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the movement stability. 
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The project of the two houses was disliked by the 
, 
public in general, but especially by Sieyes and many of the 
70 
deputies of the Third Estate who considered it as a plan calcu-
lated for favoring a portion of the nobility above the other 
members of the National Assembly. They recognized that some 
factor was necessary to delay and reconsider legislation, but 
most of the Frenchmen making the constitution were inexperienced 
in political science, and impetuous and enthusiastic for a con-
26 
stltution for France. 
A Senate was for different reasons unacceptable to 
both sides of the Assembly. Tbe Left disliked it since it was 
direct divergence from the political ideals of Rousseau who, in 
his Contract Social, condemns any check or delay of popular res-
olutions. They were haunted with a fear of royal and aristo-
cratic reaction. They thought that even a Senate of the Ameri-
can type would hinder the fulfillment of their principles. The 
27 
Right were also hostile, or at least indifferent. 
The vast gatherings at the Royal Palace soon became 
25 John S. C. Abbott 
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unanimous tn asking for one chamber when it was brought to their 
attention that several members of the Assembly were suggesting 
a third chamber. They claimed that the question was not clearly 
stated and believed that the unity of the Assembly did not ex-
clude the division of the chamber. However, with this suggest-
ion the Assembly recalled all to the cpestion of two chambers. 
The vote which was taken by roll call on September 10, 1'789, re-
sulted in a tally of "499 votes for a single chamber; 89, for 
28 
two chambers; and 122, lost or not voting. 1I Thus for a second 
time, the nobles prevented a check upon hasty legislatIon. 
On the rejection of his plan of organization, Mounier 
at once resigned his seat on the constitutional committee, as 
did also Bergasse, Lally-Tollendal and Clermont-Tonnerre. Thus 
the first constitutional committee came to an end. A new com-
mittee was chosen including Sieyes, Talleyrand, Le Chapeleur, 
Thouret, Target, Desmeuniers, and Tronchet. The new committee 
contained no representatives from the nobilIty, and Talleyrand 
could not be considered as a representative of the clery. It 
represented the Left party in the Assembly--the body who desired 
29 
the form of the monarchy while destroying the substance. 
28 PhIlip J. Buchez et P. C. Roux Histoire parlementaire 
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The legislative power now consisted of a single 
chamber, and the number of representatives was fixed at 745. 
They were distributed among the Departments on the threefold 
basis of extent of land, of population, and of the amount paid 
in direct taxes. According to territory, there were 247; accord 
ing to population, 249; and according to taxes, 247. The leg-
islative department, since equality had just been proclaimed 
among all the citizens elected the representatives by universal 
30 
suffrage. However, it considered it necessary to establish 
some conditions for the exercise of political rigbts, so it pro-
claimed citizens as active and passive. Active citizens bad the 
right to vote without any qualifications; passive citizens were 
tbose who voted with a low property qualification. Voting was 
in two stages; the active citizens assembled by cantons to 
choose the electors (one for every 150 people); the electors 
assembled by departments to choose tbe 745 members of the 
Assembly. 
The legislature was to last two years and the King bad 
no power to prolong it or dissolve it, and at the end of this 
term, a new election followed naturally. The legislature might 
adjourn itself, but during tbe period of adjournment, the King 
30 Ibid., 202 
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might at certain times convoke it. The deputies were consid-
ered as representatives of the entire nation, and therefore not 
31 
bound by instructions from their constituents. The legisla-
ture was given the right to exercise the legislative power con-
jointly with the King. The representatives gave or refused 
freely their consent to all taxation; they voted the laws; de-
cided the budget; ratified treaties; and had the right to bring 
before a High Court the Ministers, public officials and all 
'accused of attempts or conspiracies against the safety of the 
32 
State or Constitut1on. Its executive power was only limited 
by the King's suspensive veto, which did not extend to financial 
bills. Its oonsent was necessary to proclaim war, and to ratify 
treaties of peaoe, oommerce, and alliance; but was debarred from 
any exercise of judicial power. 
The unicameral system waS preferred t~ the bicameral: 
system of England for two reasons: (1) the desire to fuse the 
deputies of the three estates into a single national assembly; 
(2) the difficulty of finding in a nation in which privileged 
classes no longer exist the elements with which to form an upper 
33 
and a lower house. Thus France had produced a second factor 
to check the power of absolutism in France. 
31 Brissaud, 552 
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-CHAP1'ER IV 
ORGANI2'A'l'ION OF THE JUDICIAL POWER 
Whenever a small or large group of people participate 
1n a game, a debate, or in business, they must be governed by 
rules or laws. Some person or persons are ohosen or vested with 
authority to have the final decision whenever there 1s oonfusion 
on the meaning of the rules. In all units of government, an 
agenoy or a person is needed to interpret the laws and to deter-
mine the penalties that should be plaoed on those who disobey 
the laws. After the law has been interpreted, questions con-
cerning punishment for offenders arise. To deoide suoh questions 
~ judicial or court system has been established by the govern-
ments of the nations. 
To Frenohmen in 1789, justice seemed the most impor-. 
Itant part of good government. There was notbing about whioh the 
~ahiera were so unanImou~ as the need for judicial reform. When 
~hey spoke of a sIngle law for tbe Whole country under which the 
abuses of authority would be impossible, they thought of a c~v11 
and criminal code to put an end to tbe cruelties and injustices 
1 
pf the old courts. The judicial system as well as the admin-
istrative system of France bad grown up in the course of ages; 
1 Thompson, 144 
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had never been revised on broad principles; and had ended in 
confusion and waste of power. The old system was cumbrous and 
complicated. There was complaint of tbe excessive number of 
courts--ecclesiastical, seignorial (about 80,000;000), adminis-
trative, and exceptional. A suitor· sometimes remained suspended 
for long years since appeals and petitions leading him from one 
court to another made lawsuits endless. The penalties inflicted 
2 
ranged from small fines to execution by banging. Frequently, 
those led to oI;J.e court found themselves deprived of their natu .. 
ml judges; also~ the tribunals were not easily accessible, and 
public law was still impeded with remnants of feudalism. While 
the old magistracy, as a whole, was distinguished for its in-
tegrity,the sale of judgeships and the extravagant judicial 
fees could not fail to cast a shadow over its good name. 
As the King increased hiS power over the nat10n~ he 
also exercised in an increasing degree judicial authority. He 
considered it one of the essential functions of the King. He 1s 
judge of all his subjects, and according to an expression of the 
3 
fifteenth century, he is the grand debiteur ~ justice. In all 
the prov1nces~ although sometimes concealed under diverse pre-
texes, the hand of the King was working through his intendant 
2 Brissaud, 559 
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judging civil cases, and pronouncing grave penalties--the galley 
or death. During the medieval period courts had multiplied so 
that every lord had the right and duty of holding a court for 
his tenants. Feudal, corporate, and ecclesiastical courts left 
little for the royal courts. By degrees, the royal courts over-
spread France and withdrew the business from the other courts. 
Duty and interest compelled the Kings of France to assume this 
4 
new power. 
The notion that the King was the head of all justice 
was a recognized fact to the people. Philip I made it a solemn 
obligation for the King to preserve for himself and his succes~ 
~rs the office of sole custodian of law. lilt is your right to 
guard whole and entire the law of the land" was the last recom-
mendation of the dying Louis XIV to his successor. Charles V 
on his deathbed had the crown carried to him and addressed it 
with this apostrophe: "And you, Crown of France, how precious 
you are ••• precious at an inestimable price, since the secret 
5 
of justice resides within you. Royalty and the administration 
of justice were two factors which tradition had cemented to-
gether. Ordinarily, the King commissioned the power of judging 
to his court, and in the provinces, the King delegated this 
4 The cambridge Modern History, 46 
5 Vio1:ret, 2:r 
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mission to his officers; but nevertheless, this did not detract 
from his character as judge. He held the power of judging doubt-
ful cases, and he alone could pronounce the death penalty. To 
the people of France this power appeared in a different light 
than we consider it since the King was considered as/having the 
6 
power of life and death over his subjects. According to some, 
he had the power of putting to death one-third of his subjects, 
of torturing another third, and of assuring tranquillity and 
peace to the other third. In the cah1ers, the third estate ex-
7 
pressed,its condemnation of this apparent justice. 
This absolute conception of loyalty resulted in fruit-
ful movements which further enlarged and consolidated the power 
of the King. All jurisdiction of the provinces was to be sub-
~itted to royal authority since this would give the King the 
power of diverse control. The writ of appeal was considered one 
of the most important functions of the judicial system, and as. it 
~eveloped it augmented the King's power. For during the Middle 
~ges if a vassal was refused justice by his lord, he oould ask 
~ustice from the King. Messages then were sent directly from 
~ing to vassal. 
, 
During the ancien regime justice was sometimes 
~ de Hauranne, 7 
If Viollet, 212 
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arbitrary as in the lettres de cachet, aIld often unequal when 
oases were moved from one oourt to another, and always very slow 
and very oostly. In the literature of the day, pUQlic opinion 
waS aroused toward the rigor ot the oriminal law, and against a 
mode of criminal trial which was direoted toward the doom of the 
aocused. In this respeot, the Revolution had muoh to reform. 
There were in France parlements, or courts, whioh had 
too much or too little political power to be satisfied with just 
being judges. Discord prevailed among the judges; they quarreled 
about their origin and theirtunctions. Sometimes they issued 
proclamations making known the will of the King; at other times 
8 
they forbade the execution of the K1ng 1s orders. When they re-
sisted obstinately, after a oertain number of royal commands, to 
register his edicts, the King, acoompanied by prinoes, peers, 
and a few notables, went to the parlement. There he made them 
strike out all. deorees oontrary to his will a~d insert the 
edicts he desired. These provincial parleme~ had been organ-
ized in the late Middle Ages and were members of the parlement 
of Paris.' The parlements were powerful instruments of unity 
and centralization, since the King could suspend them or im-
prison the ministers if they went against his wish. He delegat-
ed justice to the parlements, but be did not alienate his power 
. 8 Higgins, 3-4 
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of judgingj he reserved to himself the judgment of important de-
9 
oisions. If the parlement of Paris arrested, the King remained 
tbe sovereign jUdge on the case. It expressed its authority 
once when it stated that the French monarchy "would be reduced 
to a state of despotism if the ministers cont1nued to abuse the 
authority of tbe King by disposing of persons through lettres de 
oachet, of property by the ~ de justice; by suspending the 
courts of justice by exile." The King responded that the 
members of parlernent were not the true interpreters of the 
people. In the parlement seats were held by the princes of royal 
~lood, the peers of the kingdom, the grand officers of the crown, 
prelates, marshals of France, governors of provinoes, the counci-
11 
lors of state, two magistrates of the Chambre ~ comptes of 
Paris, and a deputy of eaoh provinoial earlement. 
Soon, however, the earlement of Paris broke their 
silence and threw off their respectfulness. It demanded that 
~he state of finances should be given to it since it should know 
~he amount of revenue in order to estimate the expenditures. If 
~he parlement tried to attack an abuse or plaoe a restraint on 
royal authority, the King oonsidered this as an attempt to curb 
9 Viollet, 222 
10 de Hauranne, 8 
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bis authority and resisted energetically. If, on the contrary, 
tbe ~arlement defended some inequality which the King desired to 
abolish but was powerless to do so, he then ceded full authority 
12 
to the parlement to obtain his wish. 
Finally, behind the Chatelet and parlements stood the 
ultimate court of appeal, the Conseil du Roi, the center of 
justice in France. The King's council also possessed no small 
part of the judiciary powers. The custom of removing private 
causes from the regular courts, and trying them before one or 
another of the royal councils, was a great and growing one. 
This appellate jurisdiction was due in theory partly to the doc-
trine that the King was the origin of justice; and partly to the 
idea that political matters could not safely be left to ordinary 
tribunals. The notion that the King owes justice to all his sub-
jects and that it is an act of grace, perhaps even a duty on his 
part, to administer it in person when it is possible to do so, 
is as old as the monarchy itself. Thus the ancient custom of 
seeking justice from a royal judge merely served to transfer 
jurisdiction to an irregular tribunal. Its circumference em-
braced a complicated system of departmental courts with subor_ 
dinate and embarrassing jurisdiction. In 1789, reformer.s agreed 
12 Higgins, 67 
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that the number of courts must be reduced. There must be an end 
of private and privileged jurisdictions. Magistrates must no 
longer be obtained by heredity or by purchase. Bribery must be 
abolished. 
The first proposal for reform came from the group that 
had supported a second chamber and the absolute veto. Bergasse 
presented the outline for a new judicial system on August 17. 
Since the time of Montesquieu, it was a known fact that a ju .. , 
ic1al power should exist independent of the legislative and ex-
ecutive power. Bergasse's plan was to keep the judiciary dis-
tinct from the executive and the legislative, wholly to abolish 
purchase, to abolish the penalty of confiscation and introduoe 
13 
an element of popular election by appointment. At first, ther 
was hesitation in recognizing the judicial power as distinct 
from the executive. However, the Constitution followed the doc-
trine of Montesquieu and adopted the system of election of 
judges. The question of judicial power, as all other questions, 
was discussed in long debates. However, the men of 1789 set 
down their decisions very briefly in the Constitution of 1791. 
Twenty-seven articles lay down the charter of revolutionary 
justice. The judiciary is to remain independent of the 
13 Thompson, 147 
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legislature and exeoutive. Justioe will be administered free 
14 
of oharge by justioes eleoted from t1me to time by the people. 
Judges of every degree were eleoted. To those draft1ng the oon-
stitution this was a return to primitive rights. Bourke stated 
"until the year 697 ••• the people had ohosen the1r own judges, 
and from this year they began to lose their rights." The people 
15 
were to take baok onoe again the power usurped by the K1ng. 
The judioial power thus oreated was not a true politi-
',' 
oal power. Politioal powers organize and oonduot sooiety. ' The 
judioial power, bound by law, interprets and applies law and • 
does not have the spontaneity, the init1ative, the power of d1'o .. 
~eotion and organization. In prinoiple, the struoture of the 
judioiary should not ohange from generation to generation sinoe 
it remains outside politioal institutes. However in 1789, the 
revolution was so profound that it touohed the judioial power 
16 
as well as all others. 
Judioial reorganization was modeled first on the prin-
oiple that all powers emanated from the nation. Thus, as in the 
other powers, the sovere1gnty of the people was applied to the 
judioiary. The people delegated 1ts power to the judges, and 
asked in return a just dealing from them. Here the people had 
14 Appendix IV 
15 Made11n, 126 
16 Deslandres, 120-121 
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taken the place of the King. The second principle rigorously 
applied was the separation of powers. "The ,judicial power," 
states the constitution of 1791, "is not able in any case to be 
17 
exercised by the legislative or the King." The same independ-
ence 1s given to the legislative departments. The third princi-
ple applied in the domain of justice was the abolition of arbi-
tration. Articles IV to XIX of the judicial power develop 
18 
minutely the individual liberty of the people. Another char-
acteristic of the new system was the renderIng of justice gratu-
itous ly. 
Finally, the judicial system established two new 
Inst1tutions--the Supreme Court of Appeal, and the High National 
Oourt. The Supreme Court of Appeal was to pass judgment on 
cases which expressed a contradiction in law. All law in France 
~ad been unified, and a supreme magistrate was needed to inter-
pret the law. It was obliged to render equal sentences on like 
cases from different tribunals. It was considered indispensable 
, 19 
~or the just function of justice. The High National was formed 
of members of the Supreme Court of Appeal and exercised jurisdic-
tion over members and actions which disturbed the general sta-
bility of the nation. It consisted of a court and a jury which 
17 Appendix "LV 
18 IbId., 
19 Deslandres, 123 
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exeroised authority either over men oocupying high State posi-
tions, or over orimes committed against the State itself. Thus 
the oonstitution had found an institution to guarantee the na-
tion against men too powerful, or of orimes too grave to be 
20 
judged by ordinary judges. The King's oouncil whioh had pos-
sessed strong judioiary power were now responsible to the legis-
lative body under the new oonstitution. Thus the separation of 
powers struok a serious blow at the jur!sdAotion of the oounoil. 
The new administrative divisions served as judicial 
divisions also, and the King was refused the power to interfere 
in any way in the eleotions. The old oourts inoluding the 
parlements were one after another abolished. In eaoh district, 
there was a oivil judge and a oriminal oourt whose justices were 
eleoted by the eleotors of the district. Each district was divid 
ed into cantons which held primary eleotions to eleot justices of 
the peace for trying petty cases, and to prevent laWSUits. 
Superfluous courts and the inheritanoe of judges thus disappear-
21 
ed from France. 
Thus much remedial legislation acoompanied this new 
framework. The procedure of a trial was rendered more favorable 
to the accused since trial by jury as in England was adopted in 
20 The Cambridge Modern History, 206 
~l r:-Cahen et R. Guyot t'oeuvre legislative de la revolution. 
Libraire Felix Alcon, Paris, 1913, 42 
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orimina1 oases; every department was now equipped with a grand 
jury. Under the old system the maxim, "all justice emanates 
from the King" now became "all justice emanates from the nation. 
Justice was now rendered in the name of the State. Securities 
were taken against arbitrary arrest and imprisonment, and the 
law was made the same for all without distinction of persons. 
A new penal oode, similar to the criminal law in force in other 
countries, was drawn up. Heresy and magiO were no longer recog-
nized as crimes. Tort?re was abolished; and the punishment ot 
death, formerly meted out for slight offences, was confined to 
22 . 
four or five grave offences. In criminal matters, after the 
accusation is admitted, it must be recognized and declared by 
the jury. The trial w111 be public, and the help of a oonsul 
may not be refused the accused person. Anyone aoquitted by a 
legal jury may never be retaken or acoused for the same faot. 
All men seized and led before the police must be examined imme~ 
~ately or at least within twenty-tour hours. If he 1s not f~und 
gUilty, he must be freed immediately.; if he is, and is able to 
give suffioient bond where the law permits him to be free, he 
23 
must be freed.' 
The commissionaire of the King would examine the 
22 Brissaud, 560 
23 Cahen, 42-44 
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deoision given by the Supreme Court of Appeal and the High 
National Court and see ~hat the judgment was exeouted. If the 
minister of Justioe exoeeded the bounds of power, he would be 
denounoed to the High Court of Appeal through the oommissionaire 
of the King. If he were aocused of treason, the orime would go 
to the legislative body who would render a seoret decision and 
24 
return it to the High National Court. 
The Constitutional Assembly, considering the judioial 
power as one of the manifestati ons of nati.onal sovereignty 
believed that those who exeroised it should be elected, pass 
certain qualifioations, and have some experience. In the 
anoien regime, most of the munioipal officers did not know how 
to read or write and oould not understand the oomplioated 
25 
decrees and instruotions whioh came from Paris. Therefore, 
the Assembly provided that no one oould be seleoted as a judge 
who was not twenty-five years of age, and had not practioed 
law for five years. The term of office was six years. 
The prinoiple that a tribunal oonsists of several 
, judges was preserved from the anoient regime, but deorees of 
jurisdiotion were abolished since all tribunals ware now equal 
and appeals could be taken from one court to another. Three 
24 Ibid" 45 
25 Ta1ne, 199 
r 
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k1nds of tribunals were created: ordinary or d1strict courts, 
just1ces of peace, and a Court of Review. The new judges dis-
carded the w1g and gown of the old regime. The Court of Review 
was to 1nsure a uniform interpretation of the law throughout al~ 
the State. Thus the un1formity of decisions was recognized as 
a necessary compliment of legislative unity. However, 1f the 
power of judg1ng were not separate from the leg1slat1ve and ex-
ecutive powers, there would be no liberty of the power of judg-
1ng. It it were joined to the legislature, the 11fe and 11berty 
of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control; for the 
judge then w~uld be the leg1s1ator. If it were joined to the 
execut1ve power, the judge might behave with all the violenoe of 
26 
an oppressor. From the simplified judic1al organizat1on with 
which the Constitut1onal Assembly endowed the country, oerta1n 
consequences followed; namely, the abolition of exceptional 
courts, and jurisdiction privileges. All citizens were obliged 
27 
to sue before the same judges and according to the Same form. 
The separation of the judicial branoh from the ex-
ecut1ve and legislat1ve produoed three important results in 
Franoe. 
26 H1ggins, 41 
27 Br1ssaud, 561 
1. Justioe oould not be administered 
by the King, nor in general by 
the holders of exeoutive power, 
nor by the legislative body. 
2. Conversely, the judges oould not 
bring the members· of the admin-
istration before them for aots 
done in their off1oes. The 
deo1s1ons of administrative oon-
troversies were entrusted to the 
administrative bodies themselves. 
3. The judge oould not meddle in 
the exeroise of legislative power 
whether by jurisdiotion or the 
exeout1on of laws, nor oould they 
pass upon the Constitutionality 
of laws.28 
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The separation of powers was now oompleted. Three distinot 
organs of government were substituted for the fountainhead of 
all author1ty--the King's will. 
28 ~., 563 
r 
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CONCLUSION 
The Constitution of 1791 was a protest against abso-
lute power; therefore, this power was weakened by dividing it. 
Evolution in government had made rapid strides in France from 
the opening of the States General, May 5, 1789 until the accept-
ance of the constitution by the King, September 14, 1791. Step 
by step in the hierarchy of government, power had slipped down-
ward and henceforth belonged by virtue of the Constitution of 
1791 to the authorities who sat at· the bottom of the ladder. 
Tbe constitution itself was not an impractical instrument; in 
some respects it deserved and received universal approval. If 
it left much to be desired, it must be remembered that much was 
demanded. It abol ished feudalism partially, privilege almost 
entirely, and absolutism altogether. It created a kind of 
social and political equality before the law, and it attempted 
to create equality of opportunity, and to abolish arbitrary 
arrest. 
, 
The majority of Frenchmen felt that the Revolution 
would end when the Constitution was adopted, since it would re-
., 
move from France all the grievances of the ancien regime, and 
give to France a modified form of monarchical government to 
which the majority were sincerely attached. The new constitu-
89 . 
r 90 
• 
tion organized the government of France upon the principle of 
the separation of powers. The King was reduced to the position 
of an honorary president. He would have in the future no con-
trol over the administrative departments which he must direct. 
All means of control over the legislature were taken from him; 
therefore, no harmony could exist between the executive and the 
Assembly. The legislative National Assembly now consisted of 
only one chamber and its sessions were to be continual. There 
were thirty-four equal provinces out of which eighty-three de-
partments were created. Each department was again divided into 
districts and each district into cantons. Now representation 
according to population was granted. 
To give a new form of government to a kingdom which 
had endured ,for many centuries was a gigantic undertaking, and 
especially since there was scarcely an institution in France 
which did not need to be renovated. In France, moreover, re-
form had been so long delayed that when it came society col-
lapsed. The Constitution preserved some fragments of the old 
system, but failed to harmonize them with the new. According 
to the treatment of the King rendered by the constitution, the 
principle of monarchy must be absurd and immoral. The King was 
deprived of winning the confidence of the legislature for he 
might not take its chiefs to be his ministers. His veto on 
91 
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bills was merely suspensive; his part in foreign relations was 
merely subordinate. He was the ohief of an administration 
whioh would not aot; and of an armed foroe whioh would not obey. 
They thought a weak exeoutive was essential to freedom, and re-
garded the King as a disarmed enemy who must be kept impotent., 
The Constitutional Assembly consisted of sages, like 
Mounier; th1nkers, like S1eyes; part1sans, like Barnave; states-
men, like Talleyrand; and men like Mirabeau. Eaoh was inspired, 
and felt himself urged on, without a king, without a leader, 
without an army, without any other strength than their deep oon-
viction, to aooomplish his work--the plaoement of power whioh 
for oenturies had been misplaoed. But the work oarried the 
workers beyond their intentions. Government instead of being a 
fUnotion beoame a possession; the K1ng, master instead of being 
a ohief. The 'people beoame a nation; the King a orowned magis-
trate. The nation in an assembly deolared its will, and the 
hereditary and irrespons1ble K1ng exeouted it. His offioe was 
a oonoession to oustom, and he has been desoribed as a "majestio 
inutility" in the Constitution. A K1ng had been plaoed at the 
summit of its institutions so that the kingdom would not be 
oalled a republio. 
\fuen Louis XVI aooepted the Constitution whioh weak-
ened the royal power whioh he had reoeived from his ancestors, 
92 
he was sincere and harbored no secret thought of a reaction 
towards the past; but was distrustful toward the new institu-
tions. On September 30, 1791, President Thouret solemnly pro-
nounced these words before all his colleagues: "The National 
Assembly hereby declares that its mission is completed, and 
that at this moment its sittings end." The work it had pro-
duced--a ConstItution based on the separation of powers--was 
thought to ensure the happiness of France. But how shortsighted 
was this far seeing prophetic nature of the Assembly! 
• 
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APPENDIX 
APPENDIX I 
REPORT OF THE EXAMINATION OF THE CAHIERS 
MADE BY M. CLERMONT-TONNERRE ON JULY 27, 17891 
Deolared Prinoiples of the Cahiers 
• 
Artiole 1. The Frenoh Government is monarohioal. 
2. The King's person is inviolable and saored. 
3. His orown is hereditary in the male line. 
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4. The K1ng 1s the despository of the exeoutive power. 
5. Agents of authority are responsible. 
6. The royal sanotion is neoessary for the promulga-
t10n of laws. 
7. The nation makes the law with the royal sanotion. 
8. National oonsent is neoessary for loans and taxes. 
9. Taxes may be granted only from one meeting of the 
States General to the next. 
10. Property shall be saored. 
11. Individual liberty shall' be .saored. 
1 Andrews, 17 
APPENDIX II 
REPORT OF THE EXAMINATION OF THE Cl\HIERS 
MADE BY M. CLERMONT-TONNERRE ON JULY 27, 17892 
Partial Agreement of the Cahiers 
103 
.. 
Artiole 1. Has the King legislative power limited by 
the Constitutional laws of the kingdom? 
2. May the King alone make provisional polioe and 
administrative laws in the interval between the meeting 
of the States General? 
3. Shall these laws be submitted to the free registra-
tion of the sovereign oourts? 
4. May the States General be dissolved only by them-
selves? 
5. May the King alone oonvoke, prorogue, and dissolve 
the States General? 
6. In the oase of dissolution, 1s the King obliged to 
summon a new convooation immediately? 
7. Shall the States General be permanent or periodic? 
8. If they are periodic, shall there be an intermedi-
ary commission? 
9. Shall the two upper orders be united in a single 
ohamber? 
10. Shall the two ohambers be formed without distinc-
tion of orders? 
2 Andrews, 17-18 
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11. Shall the members of the order of the olergy be 
divided between the other two orders? 
12. Shall the representations of the olergy, the 
nobles and the oommons, be in the proportion of one, 
two, and three? 
13. Shall a third order be established under the name 
of the order of the peasantry? 
14. May persons having commissions, employment, or 
places at the court be deputies to the States General? 
15. Shall a two-thirds vote be necessary to pass a 
resolution? 
16. Shall taxes for the liquidation of the national 
debt be collected until it is completely paid? 
17. Shall lettres de caohet be abolished or modtfied? 
18. Shall liberty of the press be limited or 
unlimited? 
APPENDIX III 
DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND OF THE 
CITIZEN • 
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The representatives of the French people, constituted 
as a National Assembly, considering that ignorance, forgetful-
~ess, or contempt of the rights of man are the sole causes of 
public misfortunes and the corruption of governments, have re-
solved to set forth in a solemn declaration the natural, inalien-
~ble, and sacred rights of man, in order that this declaration, 
recall to them at all times their rights and duties; in order 
that the acts of the legislative power and of the executive 
power, being at each instant open to comparison with the aims of 
all political institutions, may be more respected; and in order 
that the demands of citizens, founded henceforth on simple and 
~ncontestable principles, shall tend always to the maintenance 
pf the constitution and the happiness of all. 
Accordingly, the National Assembly accepts and 
~eclares, in the presence and under the auspices of the Supreme 
Being, the following rights of man and of the citizen: 
~rticle I. Men are born and rema1n free and equal in rights. 
~ocial distinctions can be founded only upon common utility. 
~I. The purpose of all political assooiation is the safeguarding 
pf the natural and impresoriptible rights of man. These rights 
~re liberty, property, security, and resistance to oppression. 
III. The principle of all sovereignty resides essentially in 
~he nation. No body, no individual, can exercise any authority 
~hich does not expressly emanate from it. 
IV. Liberty oonsists in freedom to do all that does not harm 
others. Thus the exercise of the natural rights of man has no 
~ther limits than those whioh assure other members of society 
~he enjoyment of these same rights. These limits can be deter-
~ined only by law. 
~. The law has the right to forbid only those actions which are 
~armful to society_ All that is not forbidden by law cannot be 
prevented; and no one oan be constrained to do what it does not 
command. 
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VI. The law 1s the expression of the general will. All oitizens 
have the right to assist personally, or through their representa-
tives, in its formation. It ought to be the same for all, . 
whether it proteots or whether it punishes. All oitizens, being' 
equal in its eyes, are equally admissible to all dignities, 
plaoes, and publio positions aooording to their oapaoity, and 
without other distinotions than those of their virtues and 
talents. 
VII. No man oan be aooused, arrested, or deta1ned exoept in 
oases determined by the law, and aooording to the forms that it 
bas presoribed. Those who solioit, expedite, or exeoute arbi-
trary orders, or have them exeouted, should be punished; but 
every oitizen, summoned or seized by virtue of the law, ought to 
obey instantly. He renders himself oulpable by resistanoe. 
VIII. The law should estab11sh only those punishments whioh are 
striotly and evidently neoessary; and no one oan be punished ex-
oept by virtue of a law established and promulgated previous to 
the offense and legally applied~ 
IX. AS every man is presumed innooent until he has been deolared 
gUilty, when it is deemed indispensable to make an arr.est, all 
severity not neoessary for making sure of the person should be 
rigorously repressed by law. 
x. No one should be disturbed on aooount of his opinions, even 
in regard to religion, provided their manifestation does not dis-
turb the publio order established by law. 
~l. The free oommunioation of thought and opinion is one of the 
most preoious rights of man. Every oitizen oan then speak, 
write, and publish freely; but he shall be responsible for the 
abuse of this liberty in oases determined by law. 
XII. The guaranteeing of the 
neoessitates a publio foroe. 
the advantage of all, and not 
whom it is oonfided. 
rights of man and of the oitizen 
This foroe, is then instituted for 
for the speoial use of those to 
III. For the ma'intenanoe of the publio foroe and for the ex-
penses of the administratIon, a oommon oontribution is indispen-
sable. It ought to be equally distributed among all oitizens, 
aooording to their means. 
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XIV. All oit1zens have the right of verifying, themselves, or 
through their representatives, the necessity of the public con-
tribution, of consenting .to it without oompuls1on, of seeing how 
it is employed, and of determining the quota, assessment, pay-
ment, and duration. 
xv. Society has the right to demand from every public agent an 
account of his administration. 
XVI. A,soc1ety 1n wbicb a guarantee of rights is not assured, 
nor the separation of powers set forth, has no oonstitution. 
XVII. Property being a saored and inviolable right, no one oan 
be deprived of it, except when public necessity, lawfully asoer-
ta1ned, evidently demands it, and then only after previous and just indemnity bas been rewarded. 
, 
i 
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APPENDIX IV 
EXCERPTS FROM THE CONSTITUTION OF 1?91 
THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, wishing to found the French 
constitution upon the principles which it has just reoognized 
and proclaimed, irrevooably abolishes the institutions harmful 
to liberty and the equality of rights. 
There is no longer any nobility, peerage, hereditary 
dist1notions, distinotive orders, feudal regime, patrimonial justices, any of the titles denominations, or prerogatives de- , 
rived from them, any order of knighthood, any organizations or 
deoorations whioh require proofs of nobility, or which pre-
suppose distinotions of birth, or any other superiority than that 
of public offioials in the exeroise of their functions. 
There is to be no longer any sale or inheritanoe of 
publio offioes. 
There is to be no longer, for any p'art of the nation 
or for any individual, either privilege or exoeption under the 
law oommon to all the French. 
There are to be no longer any wardenships or corpora-
~ions of professions, arts, and trades. 
The law does not henceforth reoognize any re.ligious 
~ow or any other engagement whioh shall be in oonflict with 
natural rights or with the oonst1tution. 
CHAPrER I 
OF THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY 
I. The National Assembly, forming the legislative body, is 
permanent, and oonsists of one chamber only. 
II. It shall be formed by new elections every two years. Eaoh 
period of two years shall form one legislature. 
Ill. The dispositions of the preceding articles shall not take 
place with respect to the ensuing legislative body, whose powers 
~hall cease the last day of APril, 1?93. 
IV. The renewal of the legislative body shall be matter of full 
tright. 
V. The legislative body cannot be dissolved by the king. 
• 
CHAPrER II 
OF THE ROYALTY AND OF THE MlN IS'l'EHS 
SECTION I 
Of the Royalty and tbe King 
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I. Tbe royalty is indivisible, and delegated berea1tarl1y to 
the race on the throne, from male to male, by order of primogeni-
ture, to the perpetual exclusion of women and their descendants. 
Nothing is prejudged respecting tbe effect of renunCiations, 
in the race on the throne. 
II. The person of the King is sacred and inViolable; his only 
title is KING OF THE FRENCH. 
III. There is no authority in France superior to that of the law. 
~he king reigns only by it, and it is only in the name of the law 
that be can require obedience. 
IV. The King, on his accession to the throne, or at tbe period 
of his majority, shall take to the nation, in·the presence of the 
legislative body, the oatb TO BE FAlTHFUL TO THE NATION, AND TO 
~HE LAW; TO EMPLOY ALL THE POWER DELEGATED TO HIM TO MAINTAIN THE 
PONSTlTUTION DECREED BY THE NATIONAL CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY IN THE 
~ARS 1789, 1790, and 1791, AND TO CAUSE THE LAWS TO BE EXECUTED. 
If the legislative body shall not be assembled, the king 
~hall cause a proclamation to be issued, in Which shall be ex-
pressed this oatb, and a promise to repeat it as soon as the leg-
islative body shall assemble. 
~II. If the king, having gone out of the kingdom, does not retur~ 
on the invitation of tbe legislative body, and witbin the delay 
lPixed by tbe proolamation, which cannot be less than two months, 
pe sball be deemed to bave abdioated. , 
The delay shall oommence from the day when the proclamation 
of the legislative body shall have been published in the place 
pf its sitting; and the ministers shall be obliged, under their 
responsibility, to perform all the acts of the executive power, 
~he exercise of which sball bave-been suspended in the bands of 
tbe absent king. 
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~ECTION III 
Of the Royal Family 
V. The members of the royal family, oalled to the eventual 
suooession to the throne, enjoy the rights of an aotive oit1zen, 
but are not e11gible to any places, employs, or fUnotions 1n the 
~om1nat1on of the people. 
Exoept1ng the places of ministers, they are oapable of 
off1oes and employs 1n the nominat1on of the king; however, they 
cannot be oommanders-in-ohief of any army or fleet, nor fulfill 
the funotions of ambassadors, without the oonsent of the legis-
lative body, granted on the proposition of the k1ng. 
SECTION IV 
Of Ministers 
1. To the king alone belongs the choioe and revooation of 
ministers. 
II. The members of the present National Assembly, and suooeeding 
legislatures, the members of the tribunal of annulment, and those 
~ho shall serve in the high jury, oannot be advanoed to the 
~1nistry, nor reoeive any offioes, gifts, pensions, salaries, or-
~ommiss1ons from the exeout1ve power, or its agents, dur1ng the 
cont1nuanoe of their funotions nor during the two years after 
~aving finished the exeroise of them. 
The same shall be the oase with respect to those who shall 
~e only inscribed in the l1st of the high jury, during all the 
~ime that their insc~ipt1on shall continue. 
CHAPTER III 
OF THE EXERCISE OF THE L~ISLATIVE POWER 
SECTION I 
Powers and Functions of the 
National Legislative Assembly 
1. The constitution delegates exolusively to the legislative 
~ody the powers and funotions folloWing: 
1. To propose and decree laws: the king can only invite 
the legislative body to take an ObJect into consideration. 
2. To fix the public expenses. 
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3. To establish the publio oontributions--to determine 
their nature, quantity, duration, and mode of oolleotion. 
4. To divide the direot oontribution among the depart-
ments of the kingdom--to superintend the employ of all the 
publio revenue, and to demand an aooount of it. 
II. War oannot be determined on but by a deoree of the legis-
lative body, passed on tbe formal and neoessary proposition of 
the king, and sanotioned by him. 
In the oase of imminent or oommenoed hostilities, of an 
ally to be supported, or of a right to be preserved by foroe of 
arms, the king shall notify the same without delay to the legis-
lative body, and shall deolare the reasons of it. 
If the legislative body deoides that war ought not to be 
made, the king shall immediately take measures to stop or prevent 
all hostilities, the ministers being responsible for delays. 
During the Whole oourse of the war, the legislative body 
may require the king to negotiate peaoe, and the king is bound to 
~ield to the requisition. 
III. It belongs to the legislative body to ratify treaties of 
peaoe, allianoe, and oommeroe; and no treaty shall have effeot 
~ut by this ratifioation. 
IV. The legislative body has the right of determining the plaoe 
of its Sittings, of oontinuing them as long as it shall think 
peoessary, and of adjourning; at the oommenoement of eaoh reign, 
if it be not Sitting, it shall be bound to meet without delay. 
It has the right of polioe in the plaoe of its sittin~s, 
~nd to suoh extent around it as Shall be determined. 
It has the right of disoipline over its members; but it 
lOan pronounoe no heavier punishment than oensure, arrest for 
~ight days, or imprisonment for three. 
It has the right of disposing, for its safety, and the 
respeot that is due to it, of the foroes whioh shall be plaoed, 
~y its oonsent, in the oity where it sball hold its sittings. 
V. The exeoutive power oannot maroh, or quarter, or station 
~ny troops of the line within thirty thousand TOISES3 of the 
legislative body, exoept on its requisition, or by its authority. 
SECTION II 
Holding of the Sittings, and Form of Deliberating 
VII. The.legislative body oannot deliberate if the meeting does 
not oonsist of at least two hundred members; and no deoree shall 
3 About thirty-six miles 
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be made except by the absolute majority of votes. 
X. The king shall refuse his sanction to the decrees whose 
preamble shall not attest the observanoe of the above forms; if 
any of those deorees be sanctioned, the ministers shall neither 
put to it the seal, nor promulgate it, and their responsibilIty 
in this respect shall oontinue six years. 
SECTION III 
Of the Royal Sanotion 
I. The decrees of the legislative body are presented to the 
king, who may refuse his assent to them. 
II. In the oase of a refusal of the royal assent, that refusal 
is only suspensive. 
When the two legislatures whioh shall follow that in which 
~he decree was presented shall suocessively represent the same 
~ecree in the same terms in which it was as originally conceived, 
~he king shall be deemed to have given his sanction. 
Ill. The assent of the king is expressed to each decree by the 
Pollowing formula, signed by the king: THE KING CONSENTS AND 
.ILL CAUSE TO BE EXECUTED. 
The suspensive refusal is thus expressed: THE KING WILL 
IEXAMINE. 
IV. The king is bound to express his assent or refusal, to each 
~ecree, within two months after it shall have been presented. 
V. No decree to which the king has refused his assent can be 
presented to him by the same legislature. 
VI. The decrees sanctioned by the king, and those presented to 
pim by three successive legislatures, alone have the force of a 
~aw, and bear the name and title of k\WS. 
SECTION IV 
Connection of the Legislative Body with the King 
I. When the legislative body is definitively constituted, it 
~hall ~end a deputation to inform the king. The king may every 
~ear open the seSSion, and propose the objects, which, during 
~ts continuance, he thinks ought to be taken into consideration: 
~h1s form, however, 1s not to be considered as NECESSARY to the 
~ctivity of the legislative bOdy. 
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• III. A week, at least, before the end of each session, the leg-
islative body shall send a deputation to the king, to announce to 
him the day on which it proposes to terminate its sittings. The 
king may come, in order to close the session. 
IV. If the king find it of importance to the welfare of the 
state that the session be continued, or that the adjournment be 
put off, or take place only for a shorter time, he may send a 
message to this effect, on which the legislative body is bound 
to deliberate. 
V. The king shall convoke the legislative body, during the 
interval of its seSSion, at all times when the interest of the 
state shall appear to him to require it, as well as in those 
oases which the legislative body shall have foreseen and deter-
mined, previous to their adjournment. 
VIII. The legislative body shall cease to be a deliberating body 
~hile the king shall be present. 
IX. The acts of correspondence of the king with the legislative 
~ody shall be always countersigned by a minister. 
CHAPTER IV 
Of The Exercise of the Executive Power 
1. The supreme executive power resides exclusively in the hands 
of the king. 
The king is the supreme head of the general administration 
of the kingdom: the care of watching over the maintenance of 
public order and tranquillity is entrusted to him. 
The king is the supreme head of the land and sea forces. 
To the king 1s delegated the oare of watching over the ex-
~erior security of the kingdom, and of maintaining its rights and 
possessions. 
II. The king names ambassadors, and the other agents of politi-
~al negotiations. 
He names two-thirds of the rear-admirals, and one-half of 
~he lieutenant-generals, camp-marshals, captains of ships, and 
polonels of the national gendarmerie. 
He superintends the ooinage of money, and appOints the 
officers entrusted with this superintendence in the general 
~ommission and the mints. 
III. The king orders letters patent, brevets, commissions to be 
delivered to all the public officers that ought to receive them. 
IV. The king orders a list of pensions and gratifications to be 
tnade out, for the purpose of being presented to the legis lative 
pody each session, and decreed, if there is reason for it. 
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SECTION I 
Of the Promulgation of Laws 
I. The executive power is charged with ordering the seal of 
state to be put to laws, and causing them to be promulgated. 
It 1s equally charged with oausing to be promulgated and 
executed those acts of the legislative body which have no need 
of the sanction of the king. 
II. Two copies of each law shall be made, both signed by the 
king, countersigned by the mi~ister of justice, and sealed with 
the seal of state. The one shall be deposited in the archives 
of the seal, and the other shall be sent to the archives of the 
legislative body. 
SECTION III 
Of External Connections 
1. The king alone can keep up foreign political connections, 
~onduct negot1ations, make preparations of war proportional to 
those of ne1ghboring states, distribute the land and sea forces 
as he shall judge most suitable, and regulate their direction 
in cas e' of war. 
II. Every declaration of war shall be made in these terms: 
~Y THE KING OF THE FRENCH IN THE NAME OF THE NATION. 
CHAPTER V 
Of the Judicial Power 
1. The jud1cial power oan in no case be exercised either by 
~he legislative body or the king. 
II. Justice shall be gratuitously rendered by judges chosen for 
a time by the people, and instituted by letters patent of the 
king, who cannot refuse to grant them. They cannot be deposed, 
but for forfeiture duly judged; nor suspended, but for an accusa-
tion admitted. 
The public accuser shall be named by the people. 
V. The right of the citizens to ,terminate definitively their 
~isputed by way of arbitration shall receive no infringement from 
~he acts of the legislative power. 
VI. 'l'he ordinary courts of justice oannot receive any civil 
~ction, until it be certified to them that the parties have 
~ppeared, or that the pursuer has cited the opposite party to 
~ppear before med1ators, to endeavor to bring about a reconcilia-
!tion. 
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VII. There shall be one or more judges of peace in the cantons 
and in the towns. The number of them shall be determined by the 
legislative power. 
VIII. It belongs to the legislative power to regulate the number, 
and extent of jurisdiction, of the tribunals., and the number of judges of wbich each tribunal shall be composed. 
IX. In criminal matters, no citizen can be tried but on an 
acousation received by a jury, or decreed by the legislative 
~ody, in the cases where it belongs to it to pursue the aceuea-
!tion. 
After the admission of the aoousation, the fact shall be 
~ecognized and deolared by a jury. 
The jury whioh deolares the faot oannot be of fewer than 
Itwelve members. 
The applioation of the law shall be made by judges. 
No man aoquitted by a lawful jury oan be retaken or aocused 
on aooount of the same faot. 
XI. Every man seized upon and oonduoted before an offioe of 
polioe shall be examined immediately, or at latest in twenty-four 
pours. 
If it results from the examination that there be no ground 
Por blame against him, he shall be direotly set at liberty; or 
~f there be ground to send him to a house of arrest, he shall be 
ponduoted there with the least delay possible, and that in any 
pase oannot exoeed three days. . 
XII. No man arrested oan be detained if he give sufficient bail, 
~n all oases wbere the law permits a man to remain free under 
~a1l. 
XIV. No guard or jailor oan receive or detain any man but in 
~irtue of a mandate, order of arrest, deoree of aoousation, or 
~entenoe, mentioned in the tenth article above, nor witbout tran-
~cr1bing them t.o his own register. 
XVII. No man sball be taken up or proseouted on aooount of the 
writin~s which he has caused to be printed or published, whatever 
~e their subjects, if he has not designedly provoked disobedience 
to the law, outrage to the established powers, and resistanoe to 
~heir acts, or any of the aotions deolared crimes or offenses by 
the law. 
The oensure of all the acts of the established powers is 
permitted; but voluntary calumnies against the probity of public 
offioers, and against the reotitude of their intentions in the 
exeroise of their funotions, may be prosecuted by those who are 
the subjeots of them. 
Calumnies or injurious sayings against any kind of persons, 
~elative to the aotions of their private life shall be punished 
by prosecut i on. 
XIX. There shall be, for the whole kingdom, a single tribunal 
of annulment established near the legislative body. 
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• XXIV. The orders issued for executing the j~dgment of the tri-
bunals shall be conceived in these terms: 
tiN. (the name of the king) by the graoe of God, and by the 
constitutional law of the state, King of the French, to all pres-
ent and to come, greeting. The tribunal of has passed the 
following judgment:" 
T l'l'LE VII 
Of The Revision of GonstitutioMl Decrees 
II. When three successive legislatures sh~ll have declared an 
uniform wish for the change of any constitutional article, the 
revision demanded shall take place. 
VII. The members of the assembly of revisi()n, after having pro-
nounced together the oath TO LIVE FREE OR DlE, shall individually 
swear TO CONFn~E THEMSELVES '1'0 DECIDING ON 1'HE OBJECTS WHICH SKAL 
VE BEEN SUBMITTED TO THEM BY THE UNANIMOU8 WISH OF THREE PRE-
CEDING LEGISLATURES; AND TO MAINTAIN, IN @trER RESPECTS, WITH ALL 
HEIR POWER, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE KINGDOM DECREED BY THE 
ATIONAL CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY IN THE YBARB 1789, 1790, and 1791: 
AND TO BE IN ALL FAITHFUL TU THE NATION, TO THE LAW, AND TO THE 
ING. 
None of the powers instituted by the oonstitution have a 
19ht to change it in its whole, or in its parts, excepting the 
eforms which may be made in it by the mode of revision, con-
ormably to the regulations of title VII, above. 
The National Constituent Assembly commits the deposit of 
it to the fidelity of the legislative body, of the king, and of 
he judges, to the vigilance of fathers of families, to wives 
nd to mothers, to the attachment of young oitizens, to the 
ourage of all Frenchmen. 
